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A PRACTICAL LOOK AT THE
SENTENCING PROVISIONS OF S. 1722
GERALD BARD TJOFLAT*
The current federal criminal sentencing provisions clearly need re-
vamping. As the Senate Committee on the Judiciary has noted:
The sentencing structure of present Federal criminal law . . . is riddled
with irrationality and inconsistency. In title 18 alone, there are no fewer
than seventeen different maximum terms, apart from the death penalty,
and fourteen different fine levels. Only occasionally, as if by accident, are
fines related to the amount of injury inflicted or gain realized by the of-
fender .... Grading of offenses is also erratic. Similar conduct is often
treated with gross disparity. . . . In plain terms, the present penalty
structure offends the precept of equality before the law.'
The present laws give the sentencing judge considerable latitude in
imposing sentences. While this latitude furthers the goal of individual-
ized sentencing,2 it leaves the judge with little guidance, other than his
own experience, in choosing the most appropriate sentence. He has lit-
tle access to information about the past success of particular sentences or
about what other judges in other courts have done with respect to simi-
larly situated defendants. 3 Further, each judge has his or her own ideas
* The author has been a United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit since 1975.
From 1970.to 1975 he served as United States District Judge for the Middle District of Flor-
ida. For the two-and-one-half years preceding his appointment to the federal bench, Judge
Tjofiat served as a judge of the Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida.
For the past four years Judge Tjoflat has been a member of the Advisory Corrections
Council, established by 18 U.S.C. § 5002 (1976). He has served as a member of the Judicial
Conference of the United States Committee on the Administration of the Probation System
since 1972, and as Chairman of that committee since 1978. The Probation Committee is a
standing committee responsible for overseeing the organization and work of the federal pro-
bation system and for conducting sentencing institutes for judges and others as authorized by
28 U.S.C. § 334 (1976).
Judge Tjoflat obtained his LL.B. at Duke University School of Law in 1957.
1 S. REP. No. 96-553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980).
2 Se note 59 infra.
3 The judiciary itself is very concerned about this lack of reliable information. In an
attempt to remedy the problem, the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on
the Administration of the Probation System is currently developing a probation information
management system, known as "PIMS," which will "[p]rovide up-to-date information to
guide sentencing courts in selecting sentences for convicted defendants." DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE Ju-
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about the purposes to be accomplished through sentencing.4 As a result,
similarly situated defendants often receive widely varying sentences for
committing the same crime. 5
These shortcomings in federal sentencing arise at least in part from
the absence of a systematic, comprehensive federal criminal code.6 Ef-
forts to correct this deficiency can be traced to 1952, when the American
Law Institute began work on a model penal code.7 This model code,
which was published in official form ten years later,8 led many states to
enact comprehensive criminal codes. 9 Following their example, Con-
gress, in 1966, created the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws to study the existing law and to recommend "legislation
which would improve the Federal system of criminal justice," and "such
changes in the penalty structure as the Commission may feel will better
serve the ends of justice."' 0 The Commission's final report I I has served
as the foundation for several proposed bills to codify the United States
criminal law. The current Senate bill, S. 1722, which is the subject of
this article, is thus the result of considerable thought and labor.
12
Section 101 of S. 1722 describes the general purposes of the bill. In
DICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES HELD AT WASHINGTON, D.C., MARCH 10-11,
1977, AND SEPT. 15-16, 1977 74-75. This pilot project, which is still in the developmental
stage, is projected to be ready for pilot use in 1983.
4 See S. REP. No. 96-553 at 915.
5 See generally Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972). Specific
examples of unwarranted sentence disparities have been chronicled elsewhere. See, e.g., A.
VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 29 (1976); Reform ofthe Federal
Criminal Laws: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on
theJudiciay, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3896-912 (1972) (INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INSTITUTE STUDY OF SENTENCING IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws.- Hearings on S / and S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciag, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 8101-32
(1974) (excerpts from THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE
JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings]; Schwartz, Reform ofthe
Federal Criminal Laws: Choices, Tactics and Prospects, 1977 DUKE L.J. 171, 174; Zumwalt, The
Anarchy of Sentencing in the Federal Courts, 57 JUD. 96, 97-98 (1973). But see Hoffman, Purposes
and Philosophies of Sentencing, 75 F.R.D. 287, 288 (1977) (sentencing disparity is no longer a
significant problem).
6 See S. REP. No. 96-553 at 3.
7 Id at 11. See generally Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REV.
1097 (1952); Wechsler, Codifcation of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1968).
8 See MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
9 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 11-12. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 174.
10 Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516, 1517, amended, Pub. L. No. 91-
39, 83 Stat. 44 (1969). See note preceding 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 175;
S. REP. No. 96-553 at 12.
11 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, FINAL REPORT
(1971).
12 S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980). S. 1722 is on the floor of the Senate at the time
this article is being written. Its counterpart in the House, H.R. 1647 is now in committee.
[Vol. 72
CRIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM
the area of sentencing, the bill seeks to establish "a system of fair and
expeditious procedures" for imposing sentences.13 Sentences imposed
under the system must be designed to fulfill four specific goals: to deter
criminal conduct, to dispense just punishment, to protect the public
from further criminal acts of the defendant (to incapacitate the defend-
ant), and to promote correction and rehabilitation.
1 4
Although these purposes are straightforward, attaining them is not
a simple process, and despite the concern and effort that has gone into
drafting S. 1722, its sentencing provisions still contain defects. The pur-
pose of this article is to pinpoint several problems generated by the bill's
sentencing scheme and to evaluate the likely impact of that scheme on
the federal criminal justice system as a whole.
I shall assess the sentencing provisions of S. 1722 from the practical
standpoint of a judge who must interpret and apply them. My chief
vehicle for discussion will be a hypothetical case, beginning with the
arrest of two hypothetical offenders and proceeding through their sen-
tencing hearings, motions to correct their sentences and their various
appeals. As a foundation for my hypothetical case, I must predict how
S. 1722 would be implemented. In making my predictions I shall use a
strictly literal approach to interpreting the bill and attempt to take the
most obvious and direct path.
Before commencing with the hypothetical case, I shall give a brief
overview of the S. 1722 sentencing provisions. We may then proceed
through the hypothetical case and point out problems as they might
arise in the context of the various sentencing proceedings. I shall con-
clude the article with some general observations about the effectiveness
of the S. 1722 provisions and some suggestions for improving the quality
of the sentencing function.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF S. 1722t
5
S. 1722 would create an independent United States Sentencing
Commission within the judicial branch to serve as the prime mover in
(The sentencing provisions of H.R. 1647 are substantially the same as those of last year's
version, H.R. 6915.)
I have selected S. 1722 for my discussion, rather than its House counterpart, because
federal criminal code revision was initiated by the Senate Judiciary Committee and because
the sentencing provisions of S. 1722, in their present form, have the unqualified endorsement
of the Department of Justice.
13 Id tit. I, §§ 101(c), 101(c)(3).
14 Id § 101(b).
15 The reader should bear in mind that this review does not purport to be comprehensive
or detailed. My object is only to provide an overview of the bill in order to prepare
unfamiliar readers for the analysis that follows. I discuss only those portions of the bill that
are directly relevant to later discussion.
1981]
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federal sentencing reform. 16 Under the proposed legislation one of the
Commission's chief duties would be to promulgate guidelines for federal
sentencing courts to use in determining sentences for criminal defend-
ants. These guidelines, covering "each category of offense involving
each category of defendant,"1 7 would prescribe the type and extent of
sentence to impose in most cases. 18
In order to create the sentencing guidelines, the Commission must
categorize federal offenses according to severity.19 S. 1722 delineates
specific matters and circumstances the Commission must consider in
performing this task.20 In addition to offense categories, the Commis-
sion must establish categories of defendants that reflect different combi-
nations of specified personal characteristics.
21
The finished guidelines probably would take the form of a grid that
reflects the various combinations of offense and offender categories. 22 In
establishing sentences to fit these different combinations, S. 1722 directs
16 S. 1722 provides:
(b) The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to-
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice sys-
tem that-
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section
101(b) of title 18, United States Code [these purposes include just punishment, deter-
rence, incapacitation and rehabilitation];
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoid-
ing unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flex-
ibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravat-
ing factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices;
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human be-
havior as it relates to the criminal justice process; and
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and
correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in
section 101(b) of title 18, United States Code.
S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 991(b).
17 Id § 994(b).
18 Id § 994(a)(1).
19 I § 994(c). See id tit. I, § 2301(b); S. REP. No. 96-553 at 923.
20 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(c). See notes 55 & 60 & accompanying text infra.
21 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(d). Two recent amendments to the bill, made after
the Senate passed its predecessor, S. 1437, in 1978, might be noted. The first directs the
Commission to assure that the guidelines and policy statements remain neutral "as to the
race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders." Id The second re-
quires the Commission to ensure that an offender's education, vocational skills, employment
record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties are not considered in the decision
to impose a term of imprisonment or in deciding the length of a term of imprisonment. Id
§ 995(e).
22 This grid might resemble the one the United States Parole Commission currently uses
in determining when to release incarcerated offenders. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979); Hoffman
& Beck, Parol Decision-Making.- A Salient Factor Score 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 195 (1974); Hoffman &
DeGostin, Parole Decision-Making: Structuring Discretion, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1974, at 12-15;
Hoffman & Stone-Meierhoefer, Application of Guidelines to Senteing, 3 LAw & PSYCH. REV. 53
(1977).
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the Commission to bear in mind the four purposes of sentencing: deter-
rence, incapacitation (protecting the public), punishment, and rehabili-
tation.23 Further, the Commission must take into account "the nature
and capacity of the penal, correctional, and other facilities and services
available" 24 in order to assure full and proper utilization.
25
Although implementation of S. 1722 is expected to be an overall
reformation of the federal sentencing system, S. 1722 directs the Com-
mission to be guided by the average sentences imposed in similar cases
prior to passage of the bill.26 Accordingly, the guidelines should be de-
vised so that a defendant sentenced under S. 1722 would receive a sen-
tence similar to that he would have received under current law.
However, notwithstanding this general rule, S. 1722 mandates that the
Commission guidelines specify a substantial term of imprisonment for
particular types of defendants who have a substantial history of criminal
conduct or meet other specified criteria.
27
S. 1722 also directs the Commission to issue policy statements to
assist district courts in applying the guidelines and in dealing with col-
lateral matters such as probation conditions, modification of sentences,
and acceptance or rejection of plea bargains.
28
Under the proposed bill, a probation officer initially conducts a
presentence investigation and presents the results to the judge.29 Armed
with this information and the information produced at the sentencing
hearing, the judge must make findings of fact concerning "the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant. ' 30 These findings will indicate the correct offense and
defendant categories, and hence the proper guideline sentencing range
to apply. Next the judge must determine the primary purpose for sen-
tencing in the particular case at hand: Is deterrence of great concern?
Do the facts indicate that the defendant needs to be incapacitated-that
23 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(g). The Commission must, however, ensure that
defendants are not sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitation. Id
§ 9940). The need for rehabilitation may be considered in imposing a sentence of a fine or
probation, however. St S. REP. No. 96-553 at 942.
The Commission must also consider the need to provide certainty and fairness in sen-
tencing and to avoid unwarranted sentence disparity among convicted offenders. S. 1722, tit.
III, § 994(o.
24 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(g).
25 Id
26 Id § 994(1).
27 Id § 994(h). See notes 72-73 & accompanying text infra.
28 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(a)(2).
29 Id tit. I, § 2002(a). S. 1722 provides the sentencing judge with other means of gather-
ing information about the defendant. He may order a presentence study and report by the
Bureau of Prisons, id § 2002(b), or he may order a presentence examination and report by a
psychiatric examiner. Id § 2002(c).
30 Id § 2003(a) (1).
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is, physically restrained-in order to protect the public from his future
crime? How great is the need for punishment? Does the defendant need
"educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment"?3t
Once he has determined the primary purpose for sentencing the
defendant, the judge must consider the range of sentences available
32
under the guidelines.33 The judge must impose a sentence of the type
and extent set forth in the guidelines unless he or she finds that "an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines and that should result in a sentence different from that
described."
34
Upon pronouncing sentence, the court must state its reasons for im-
posing that particular sentence. If the sentence is within the guideline
range, the court must state why it chose a particular point within the
range.35 If the sentence is outside the guideline range, the court must
explain why the guideline range was inappropriate in the particular case
at hand.
36
The defendant may appeal a sentence for a felony or Class A mis-
demeanor if it falls above the guideline range, and the prosecutor may
appeal if the sentence falls below the range.3 7 The court of appeals, in
either case, considers whether the sentence is "unreasonable" in light of
the goals of sentencing and the reasons the lower court advanced for
31 Id § 2003(a)(2). As noted earlier, the need for rehabilitation cannot serve as a purpose
for imprisoning the offender. See note 23 supra.
32 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 2003(a)(3). S. 1722 provides for probation, fines and
imprisonment. Id § 2001(b). In addition to these basic sentences, a judge may order crimi-
nal forfeiture, id § 2004; notice of conviction to the victims of the crime, id § 2005; restitu-
tion, id § 2006; or supervised release after a term of imprisonment, id. § 2303.
33 Under the guidelines the judge will probably have some discretion, within relatively
narrow boundaries. For instance, title III, § 994(b) provides that when the guidelines specify
a term of imprisonment, the Commission may present the judge with a range in which to set
the length of the term, as long as the maximum term in the range does not exceed the mini-
mum term by more than 25%. Similarly, the applicable guidelines might present several
alternative types ofsentence. On the other hand, the Commission could decide to restrict the
sentence to only one type and to provide no sentencing range at all. See note 263 & accompa-
nying text infra.
34 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 2003(b).
35 Id § 2003(c).
36 Id
37 Id § 3725. However, neither side can appeal if "the sentence is equal to or greater than
the sentence recommended or not opposed by the attorney for the government pursuant to a
plea agreement under Rule I I (e) (1) (B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" or if "the
sentence is that provided in an accepted plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11 (e)(1)(C)." Id
§§ 3725(a) & (b). The prosecutor must have the personal approval of the Attorney General
or the Solicitor General before the government may appeal the imposition of a sentence bel-
low that specified in the guidelines. Id § 3725(b).
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choosing the challenged sentence.38
If the sentence is within the guideline range, neither party may ap-
peal. A party may nonetheless contend that the sentencing judge ap-
plied the guidelines incorrectly. In such a case the party may move the
sentencing court to correct the sentence under a proposed amendment
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) (2). 39 Under this procedure
the sentencing court can correct the sentence within 120 days of its im-
position.40 Either party then can petition a United States Court of Ap-
peals for leave to appeal a district court order granting or denying a rule
35(b)(2) motion.
4 '
The proposed statute would preserve existing rule 35 provisions al-
lowing correction of an illegal sentence and correction of a sentence im-
posed in an illegal manner. Correction of a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner would have to occur within 120 days of sentencing.
42
Correction of an illegal sentence can occur at any time.4 3 S. 1722 does
not purport to disturb current methods of appealing lower court deci-
sions when an illegal sentence is alleged. 44
Finally, under S. 1722 the convicted offender would serve his sen-
tence in full, except for minor "good time" adjustments.4 5 Parole, and
the Parole Commission, would be abolished.
46
With this general overview we can proceed to the hypothetical case.
In the text I shall refer to Senate Bill 1722 as "the Code," since I shall be
assuming, for the purposes of my analysis, that S. 1722 has been passed
in its current form.
38 Id § 3725(e).
39 S. 1722 provides:
Rule 35.-Correction of Sentence
(a) Correction of an Illegal Sentence.-The court may correct an illegal sentence at
any time.
(b) Correction of an Illegally or Erroneously Imposed Sentence.-The court, on
motion of either party or on its own motion, may correct-
(1) a sentence imposed in an illegal manner;
(2) a sentence imposed as a result of incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a); or
(3) a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. 2006 as a result of the use of an inappro-
priate procedure to determine the amount of restitution;
within 120 days after the sentence is imposed.
Id tit. II, § 111 (t).
40 Id
41 Id tit. I, §§ 3723(b), 3724(d).
42 Id tit. II, § 111(t). See note 197 infra.
43 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. II, § I11(t). See note 193 & accompanying text infra.
44 See note 273 & accompanying text infra.
45 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 927.
46 Id The bill does, however, provide for supervised release after imprisonment. If the
court imposes a prison term of over one year, § 2303 allows it to impose a term of supervised
release to commence as soon as the prison term ends. S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 2303.
1981]
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II. THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE
A. THE FACTS, THE CHARGE AND THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
REPORT
Suppose that two individuals, "Advantaged" and "Disadvan-
taged," are arrested in the Florida Keys while smuggling 5,000 pounds
of marijuana and ten kilograms of cocaine into the United States.
Thereafter, a grand jury in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida returns a one-count indictment charging
Advantaged and Disadvantaged with drug smuggling in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1812, a Class B felony.47 At arraignment, the defendants enter
pleas of not guilty. They move on fourth amendment grounds to sup-
press the evidence that the federal officers seized at the time of arrest,
but the district judge denies their motion. The defendants then consent
to a bench trial and are found guilty as charged. The district judge
requests a presentence investigation of each defendant 48 and instructs
the probation officer conducting the investigations to indicate in his re-
ports the sentencing alternatives prescribed in the Commission guide-
lines and policy statements. 49 The court subsequently receives reports of
47 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 1812.
48 Section 2002(a) requires that probation officers conduct and report presentence investi-
gations in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c). Id § 2002(a). Rule
32(c), as amended by S. 1722, requires an investigation and report in each case unless "the
court finds that there is in the record information sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise
of sentencing authority pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2003, and the court explains this finding on the
record." Id tit. II, § 1 lI(s)(4).
49 Rule 32(c), as amended by S. 1722, requires:
The report of the presentence investigation shall contain-
(A) information about the history and characteristics of the defendant, including
his prior criminal record, if any, his financial condition, and any circumstances affecting
his behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence or in the correctional treatment of
the defendant;
(B) the classification of the offense and of the defendant under the categories es-
tablished by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a) of title 28, that the
probation officer believes to be applicable to the defendant's case; the kinds of sentence
and the sentencing range suggested for such a category of offense committed by such a
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1); and an explanation by the probation officer of any
factors.that may indicate that a sentence of a different kind or of a different length than
one within the applicable guideline would be more appropriate under all the circum-
stances;
(C) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(2);
(D) Verified information stated in a nonargumentative style containing an assess-
ment of the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact upon, and cost to, any
individual against whom the offense has been committed; and
(E) such other information as may be required by the court.
Id § Ill(s) (2 Report). The practice prior to S. 1722 has been to include the applicable Pa-
role Commission guidelines in presentence investigation reports. See DIVISION OF PROBA-
TION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, THE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT 7 (Publication 105, 1978).
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those investigations and, in accordance with rule 32(c) (3), Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, ensures that appropriate disclosure is made to
the defendant, the counsel for the defendant, and the attorney for the
government.
The presentence investigation reports summarize the evidence pro-
duced at trial: Advantaged and Disadvantaged, both twenty-one years
of age, played identical roles in the charged offense and are equally cul-
pable. A team of Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Customs
Service agents arrested them at 2:00 a.m. while they were unloading
marijuana and cocaine from a fifty-four-foot motor yacht onto a private
dock near Key Largo. A nautical map found on the yacht indicates that
the yacht had made a rendezvous with a "mother ship" one hundred
miles out in the Gulf of Mexico the previous day, presumably to pick up
the contraband. Apparently, other participants in the smuggling opera-
tion were to meet the defendants at the dock, but suddenly aborted their
mission when they discovered the federal agents staked out around the
landing site. The Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the case
told the probation officer conducting the presentence investigation that
Advantaged and Disadvantaged, along with seven or eight others still at
large, had been suspected of smuggling activities for some time and that,
following an informant's tip, the government had begun the surveillance
that culminated in the defendants' arrests. The presentence investiga-
tion reports, however, contain no facts about the defendants' involve-
ment in drug smuggling other than those derived from the recent
surveillance. These facts were related by the agents who both partici-
pated in that surveillance and arrested the defendants for the charged
offense.
Advantaged's presentence investigation report discloses that he
comes from a well-to-do, socially prominent Miami family and that he
has completed two years of college. He was on a one-semester leave of
absence, due to unsatisfactory academic performance, when the offense
occurred. Advantaged has been gainfully employed only during sum-
mer vacations from school, when he worked as a laborer on some con-
struction jobs for his father, a road builder. His performance on those
jobs was rated satisfactory.
Advantaged's parents' marriage is intact and apparently tranquil.
Advantaged has two older sisters, both married. His family members
told the investigating probation officer that the family is close-knit and
that if Advantaged were placed on probation, they would do everything
possible to help him rehabilitate himself and complete his college work.
They professed to have been completely surprised by Advantaged's in-
volvement in smuggling; nothing had previously occurred, they said,
that would have led them to suspect that he was involved with drugs.
1981]
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Disadvantaged's presentence investigation report discloses an en-
tirely different background. He is the product of a broken home from
Miami's inner-city; neither parent could be located. Disadvantaged has
had no formal schooling since the ninth grade. He says that he worked
briefly for three companies during the past two years, but the investigat-
ing probation officer was unable to verify this claim. Although Disad-
vantaged has had no identifiable means of support, he recently moved
into an expensive apartment and he owns a new automobile. He was
convicted in state court of possessing marijuana when he was eighteen
years old and was placed on probation, which he satisfactorily served,
for one year. It is inferrable from the presentence investigation report
that he makes his living trafficking drugs.
In his presentence investigation report on each defendant, the pro-
bation officer set out the Sentencing Commission guidelines he thought
applicable in light of the information he had gathered. As previously
noted,50 the district court, in determining the appropriate sentence,
must first ascertain the appropriate category of offense and category of
defendant for the case at hand. Then the court must refer to the Sen-
tencing Commission guidelines and policy statements for the applicable
sentencing range. The judge must "impose a sentence of the kind, and
within the range," described in the sentencing guidelines. 51 If thejudge,
however, finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances that the Sen-
tencing Commission did not consider adequately in formulating the
guidelines, he may impose a sentence outside of the guideline require-
ments.
52
B. THE APPLICABLE GUIDELINES
According to the probation officer, section 1812 violations commit-
ted under the circumstances of this case fall into a "category of offense"
that the Commission has designated as "very high severity." Since Ad-
vantaged and Disadvantaged played the same role in the offense and are
equally culpable, the same category of offense applies to both of them;
the guidelines and accompanying policy statements require that both
Advantaged and Disadvantaged be sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment.
The probation officer finds, however, that the guidelines do not
place Advantaged and Disadvantaged in the same "category of defend-
ant." The differences in their backgrounds and character traits uncov-
ered during the presentence investigations are significant enough to
50 See notes 30-31 & accompanying text supra.
51 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 2003(b).
52 Id
[Vol. 72
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cause them to receive different offender classifications. As a conse-
quence, the terms of imprisonment that the guidelines prescribe are not
the same: the guidelines call for a fixed term between forty and fifty
months in Advantaged's case, and a fixed term between sixty and sev-
enty-five months in Disadvantaged's case.
At this point, I would like to digress momentarily from the proceed-
ings against Advantaged and Disadvantaged to discuss the way in which
the Sentencing Commission might have devised the guidelines that the
probation officer has proffered. I suggest that the Commission em-
ployed a three-step process to arrive at the kind of sentence and sentenc-
ing range applicable to our defendants. First, the Commission
categorized the section 1812 offense of drug smuggling, and all other
federal crimes, in terms of severity and decided which statutory sentenc-
ing purposes were most relevant in fashioning a sentence for each of-
fense. Second, it created categories of defendants, each category
consisting of a unique combination of personal characteristics thought
to be of significance in designating an overriding sentencing purpose in
each case and in fashioning a sentence to promote that purpose. Third,
the Commission consolidated the two categories (offense and defendant)
to derive the kind of sentence and sentencing range that would, under
the circumstances, best promote the four purposes of sentencing pre-
scribed by the Code:53 general deterrence, incapacitation, punishment,
53 It is only suggested that the Sentencing Commission employed this three-step process.
The Code contains no express mandate that such a process be followed. A brief discussion of
what Congress has directed the Commission to consider in promulgating sentencing guide-
lines, however, indicates that the suggestion is a valid one.
The Code requires the Sentencing Commission to establish a sentencing guideline "for
each category of offense involving each category of defendant." Id tit. III, § 994(c). The
Code then sets forth specific considerations the Commission should entertain in establishing
categories of offense, id., and specific personal characteristics the Commission should consider
in establishing categories of defendants, id § 994(d). For each combination of offense and
defendant categories the guidelines must specify the type of sentence to be imposed-a fine,
probation, imprisonment, or a suitable combination of these sentences--as well as the range,
or extent, of that sentence. Id §§ 994(a)(1)(A)-(B). Logically, it is only after the offense and
defendant categories are established that the Commission can proceed to sort out the various
combinations of offenses and offenders and consider the kind and extent of sentence to pre-
scribe in each instance. The process thus breaks down into three steps.
The core of the Code's sentencing process is its focus upon the four congressionally desig-
nated "purposes of sentencing": deterrence, incapacitation, punishment, and rehabilitation.
Id tit. I, § 101(b); S. REP. No. 96-553 at 930. These four purposes are pervasive. The Code
states that the Sentencing Commission exists for the purpose of ensuring that these purposes
of sentencing are observed. S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 991(b)(1)(A). Further, the Code
specifically requires the Commission to consider these four purposes in creating guidelines, id
§ 9 9 4(g), and in promulgating policy statements, id § 994(a)(2). Again, once the guidelines
have been established, the sentencing judge must consider whether the particular sentence
imposed will promote adequately these four purposes. Id tit. I, § 2003(a)(2). It stands to
reason, then, that the Commission will consider the four statutory purposes in each of the
three steps involved in establishing sentencing guidelines.
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and rehabilitation. 54
L Estabh'hzhg the Categories of Onses
Categorizing offenses is, in effect, establishing a severity rating for
each criminal offense in the Code. Title III, section 994(c) states that in
doing this, the Commission shall take into account, to the extent rele-
vant, the following offense characteristics:
(1) the grade of the offense;
(2) the circumstances under which the offense was committed which
mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense;
(3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense, includ-
54 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 101(b).
At this point it is appropriate to define these four purposes which play such an important
role in the structuring of sentencing guidelines. Based on legislative history and the generally
accepted meanings of these terms as they are currently used in the field of sentencing, the
Commission probably defined them as follows:
(1) "[D]eter [criminal] conduct." id § 101(b)(1). The Commission clarified that this
purpose includes "general deterrence," but not "specific deterrence." "General deterrence"
focuses on individuals other than the defendant being sentenced; the goal is to deter others
from committing the crime for which the defendant is charged by illustrating the conse-
quences of committing that particular crime. "Specific deterrence," on the other hand, in-
volves deterring the particular defendant being sentenced from committing further crime, in
effect locking him away from society. That concept, if included, would duplicate another
purpose of sentencing stated in § 101(b)(2): incapacitation of the defendant in order to pro-
tect the public.
Focusing its attention on the concept of general deterrence, the Commission acknowl-
edged that the imposition of any criminal sanction may have a broad deterrent effect on the
community. It indicates to onlookers that "crime doesn't pay." Further, if publicity about
the defendant's sentence describes his personal characteristics-for example, his age, his prior
convictions, his drug dependency-then other individuals with the same characteristics who
learn of the sentencing may be deterred from committing any crime. However, the Commis-
sion chose not to include this type of general "bad person" deterrence, and focused on the
offense, rather than the offender characteristics. Thus, a sentence for the purpose of deter-
rence will only encompass deterring others from committing the particular crime the defend-
ant committed. If the defendant has "bad" characteristics, then he may be sentenced in a
way that will incapacitate him from committing future crimes, but he will not be sentenced to
deter others who are like him from committing crimes generally.
(2) "[P]rotect the public from persons who engage in [criminal] conduct" (incapacita-
tion). Id § 101(b)(2). If the defendant's characteristics indicate that he will commit more
crime if given the opportunity, then he must be sentenced in a way that will deprive him of
the opportunity. Generally, this will mean imprisonment, though, conceivably, probation
may incapacitate if the conditions of probation are highly restrictive.
(3) "[A]ssurejust punishment for such [criminal] conduct." Id § 101(b)(3). The Com-
mission will probably consider the purpose of punishment for criminal conduct self-evident
and not in need of further definition.
(4) "[To] promote the correction and rehabilitation of persons who engage in [criminal]
conduct." Id § 101(b)(4). Since rehabilitation has been a central focus of sentencing for
many years, see S. REP. No. 96-553 at 912, the Commission did not feel a need to enlarge on
the concept for purposes of the new Code. Again, however, the Code prohibits making reha-
bilitation a purpose for sentencing a defendant to prison. S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III,
§ 994().
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ing whether it involved property, irreplaceable property, a person, a
number of persons, or a breach of public trust;
(4) the community view of the gravity of the offense;
(5) the public concern generated by the offense;
(6) the deterrent effect a particular sentence may have on the com-
mission of the offense by others; and
(7) the current incidence of the offense in the community and in the
nation as a whole.
55
For our purposes, I suggest that the Commission established six catego-
ries of offenses, graduated in order of severity: "low," "low moderate,"
"moderate," "high," "very high," and "greatest." It then considered the
offense characteristics listed above in deciding which category is most
appropriate for each offense.
The Commission decided that six of the seven statutory offense
characteristics were relevant in determining the severity of a section
1812 drug smuggling case. It believed these six to be relevant primarily
because they bear on the question whether punishment and deterrence,
two of the four statutory purposes of sentencing, should determine the
sentence in such cases. The first of these criteria, "the grade of the of-
fense," indicates a need for punishment and a high severity rating: sec-
tion 1812 creates a Class B felony, carrying a maximum of twenty years
imprisonment.56 The Commission construed the second criterion, "the
circumstances under which the offense was committed which mitigate or
aggravate the seriousness of the offense," to authorize the sentencing
judge to adjust the severity rating depending on the evidence produced
at the sentencing hearing.57 The Commission deemed the third statu-
tory criterion, concerning the harm caused by the offense, irrelevant be-
cause the Commission did not view drug smuggling, as distinguished
from drug peddling, as harmful to persons or property or as constituting
a breach of public trust. The Commission found the fourth, fifth, and
seventh criteria, concerning community view of the offense, public con-
cern, and current incidence of the offense, to be highly relevant. It gave
these criteria great weight because drug smuggling and trafficking had
reached epidemic proportions "in the community and in the nation as a
whole" and had generated deep "public concern." Accordingly, regard-
ing the sixth criterion, the Commission made a judgment that heavy
55 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(c).
56 See id tit. I, § 2301(b) (2).
57 Five of the section 994(d) category of defendant criteria may indicate circumstances
that aggravate or mitigate the seriousness of the offense, especially regarding the question of
criminal intent: the defendant's "(4) mental and emotional condition... ; (5) physical con-
dition, including drug dependence; ... (9) role in the offense; (10) criminal history; and (11)
degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood." Id tit. III, § 994(d). See notes
72-77 & accompanying text inra.
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sanctions must be imposed to deter others from smuggling drugs into the
United States.
In light of these statutory criteria, the Sentencing Commission
placed section 1812 drug trafficking in the "high" severity category, but
instructed sentencing judges to adjust the rating upward to "very high"
or downward to "moderate," depending on whether the circumstances
under which the charged offense was committed aggravated or miti-
gated the seriousness of the offense.
58
The Sentencing Commission also promulgated a policy statement
on section 1812 offenses indicating that punishment and general deter-
rence are mandatory objectives in sentencing one who has engaged in
drug smuggling. The policy statement concluded that a prison sentence
of at least forty months must be imposed regardless of the defendant's
category-of-offender classification.
Despite this policy statement establishing a minimum prison sen-
tence, the Commission still had to establish categories of defendants in
order to complete the sentencing guidelines for section 1812 drug smug-
gling cases.5 9 The Commission undertook this step independently of its
performance of the first step.
2. Establishing the Categories of Defendants
Section 994(d) of Code title III instructs the Commission to con-
sider the following offender characteristics, to the extent they are rele-




(4) mental and emotional condition to the extent that such condition
mitigates the defendant's culpability or to the extent that such con-
dition is otherwise plainly relevant;
(5) physical conditions, including drug dependence;
58 In our hypothetical case the probation officer concluded that the manner in which the
defendants carried out the crime and the large amount of contraband involved aggravated
the seriousness of the offense. Accordingly, he recommended grading the violation "very
high."
59 As Congress has instructed, the Commission must promulgate guidelines "for each cate-
gory of offense involving each category of defendant." S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(b).
Each category of defendant committing a given offense must be viewed separately in order to
accomplish individualized sentencing. Individualized sentencing is required not only by the
Code, but also by existing policy, and at least in capital cases, individualized sentencing is
required by the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("While the prevailing practice of individualizing
sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitu-
tional imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity un-
derlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense. .. 2).
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(6) previous employment record;
(7) family ties and responsibilities;
(8) community ties;
(9) role in the offense;
(10) criminal history; and
(11) degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.
60
At the same time, section 994(d) requires the Commission to "assure
that the (resulting) guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral
as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of
offenders."' 61 The Commission decided that although some of the de-
fendant category criteria might have a heavier impact on persons of a
particular race, sex, or socioeconomic status, Congress would not have
included them in the statute if it did not intend them to be used. Ac-
cordingly, the Commission construed the neutrality requirement to
mean that the criteria are to be used, even though they may have a
disproportionate impact, as long as they are applied neutrally.
I suggest that the Commission determined that all eleven statutory
criteria are relevant to the statutory purpose of rehabilitation. The
eleven criteria also tend to indicate whether the statutory purpose of
incapacitation is an appropriate sentencing goal, although section
994(e) indicates that five of the criteria may not be, employed in making
this determination. 62 The Commission also found that five of the eleven
section 994(d) criteria relate to whether an added measure of punish-
ment, beyond that required for simple commission of the offense, should
be meted out. Finally, the Commission found none of the criteria to be
relevant, except in the most incidental way, to determining whether a
sentence is to serve the purpose of deterrence.
63
The Needfor Rehabilitation. The connection between the eleven stat-
utory criteria and the appropriateness of rehabilitation as a sentencing
goal becomes plain in the context of a specific case. If, for example, the
offender is a young adult male with no education or vocational skills
and little history of employment, rehabilitative treatment may be
needed to prepare the offender for gainful employment. If the offender
has a history of drug dependence and scrapes with the law and has no
community or family ties, or if he tends to look to crime as a means of
60 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(d).
61' Id
62 See note 21 sura.
63 As discussed in note 54 supra, the Commission defined the statutory purpose of deter-
rence to encompass only the deterrence of others from committing the particular crime for
which the defendant is sentenced. Since the focus is on the crime defendant committed, the
defendant's personal characteristics are largely irrelevant. Deterrence of people like the de-
fendant from committing crimes general/y will occur incidentally, and only to the extent that
defendant's characteristics are publicized.
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livelihood, the need for corrective treatment is unquestionable. Accord-
ingly, the Sentencing Commission, in defining the categories of defend-
ants, concluded that rehabilitation should be an important objective in
sentencing a defendant possessing the foregoing types of characteristics.
The Need for Incapacitation. The same characteristics that indicate a
need for rehabilitation may suggest that the defendant is likely to com-
mit further crimes, and thus that he needs to be incapacitated. The
Sentencing Commission believed that an offender, such as the one in the
example above, who is unemployable and has a history of crime, is likely
to engage in further criminal conduct if given his freedom. The eleven
statutory offender characteristics, considered together, are recognized
predictive criteria. Parole commissions and others charged with making
release decisions have often used them to anticipate the probability that
convicted persons will engage in criminal conduct following release.
Probation and parole officers have also used these criteria to decide
what kind of supervision a probationer or parolee must receive in order
to abide by the conditions of his release.
64
Despite the apparent relevance of the section 994(d) criteria in de-
ciding whether a defendant must be incapacitated, Congress has re-
quired that the guidelines and policy statements, "in recommending a
term of imprisonment or length of imprisonment, reflect the general
inappropriateness of considering the [defendant's] education, vocational
skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilites, and commu-
nity ties."' 6 5 Since the need for incapacitation is generally equivalent to
64 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SALIENT FACTOR SCORE-A NONTECHNICAL
OVERVIEW (U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit Rpt. 22 1979); Hoffman & Beck, supra note
22, at 195; Hoffman & Stone-Meierhoefer, Post Release Arrest Experiences of Federal Pioners- A
Six-year Follow-up, 7 J. GRIM. JUST. 193 (1979); , Hoffman, Stone-Meierhoefer, & Beck, Salient
Factor Score and Release Behavior Three Validation Samples, 2 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 47
(1978); Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and ndi-
vidualzedJudgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1420-21 (1979).
65 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(e). The Code does not define "general inappropri-
ateness," and it is not clear under what, if any, circumstances the Commission or the sentenc-
ing judge could consider these five offender characteristics in connection with the need for
imprisonment, or incapacitation. The Commission did not pursue the question and refrained
from considering the five proscribed offender characteristics in deciding what types of offend-
ers should be incapacitated for the protection of the general public.
It is possible that Congress considered education, vocational skills, employment record,
and family and community ties to correlate too strongly with race, sex and socioeconomic
status, so that consideration of these factors would violate the § 994(d) requirement that
guidelines be "neutral as to race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of
offenders." See note 21 supra. See also Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Heanz'g on S I before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 210 (1975) (statement of
Melvin L. Wulf, Legal Director, ACLU). It is not immediately clear, however, why these five
factors are a greater threat to the neutrality requirement than some of the other defendant
characteristics, such as degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood, criminal
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the need for imprisonment, 66 Congress basically has precluded the use of
these five criteria in determining whether incapacitation is a significant
purpose of sentencing in a given case. Despite the deletion of these five
predictive elements, the Commission nonetheless determined that the
remaining section 994(d) offender characteristics 67 were adequate to
identify those individuals in need of incapacitation. 68
Prior to passage of the new Code, judges often sentenced offenders
to prison for the dual purposes of rehabilitation and incapacitation.
69
The new Code, however, makes this generally impossible. The new
Code unambiguously proscribes imprisonment for the purpose of rehabil-
itation.70 A prison sentence, however, is usually the only sentence that
history, and drug dependence. Further, the neutrality requirement applies to all kinds of
sentences: if use of these five factors would violate neutrality in the prison sentence context,
why would it not violate neutrality in other sentencing contexts, such as probation or fines?
66 See note 54 supra.
67 The remaining characteristics are age, mental and emotional condition, physical condi-
tion (including drug dependence), role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of depen-
dence upon criminal activity for a livelihood. S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(d).
68 Congress apparently considered a history of prior criminal conduct a reliable indicator
of future unlawful conduct since it decided to mandate a prison sentence in every case in
which the defendant
(1) has a history of two or more prior federal, State, or local felony convictions for
offenses committed on different occasions;
(2) committed the offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct from which he
derived a substantial portion of his income;
(3) committed the offense in furtherance of a conspiracy with three or more per-
sons engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity in which the defendant participated in
a managerial or supervisory capacity; or
(4) committed a crime of violence which constitutes a felony while on release
pending trial, sentence, or appeal from a federal, State, or local felony for which he was
ultimately convicted.
Id § 994(h). See notes 78-80 & accompanying text infra.
A desire to give recidivists enhanced punishment probably also motivated Congress.
Section 994(i) supports this conclusion, inversely, by requiring that the Commission "insure
that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than im-
prisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a
crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense." If first offenders who commit non-serious
crimes are to receive less punishment by virtue of that status, then it stands to reason that
habitual offenders, or those who commit serious crimes, must receive greater punishment by
virtue of their status.
69 Pre-Code law does not require sentencing judges to state the purpose or purposes of a
sentence, and few judges do so. However, it is generally understood that judges may and do
consider many different purposes in formulating a sentence, including incapacitation and
rehabilitation. Set, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1978); Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949); Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708-09 (5th Cir. 1979), appeal
pending, 100 S. Ct. 1311 (1980); 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1976).
70 "The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of im-
posing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant
or providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment. . . ." S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994j). This proscription
does not rule out the incidental administration of rehabilitative treatment in a prison setting
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will accomplish the purpose of incapacitation. 7 1 Under the Code, then,
rehabilitation and incapacitation cannot serve as simultaneous goals of
a sentence; they must be viewed as mutually exclusive.
Since these purposes are mutually exclusive, the Sentencing Com-
mission faced a value judgment in establishing categories of defendants,
for it was necessary to determine the priority between rehabilitation and
incapacitation when both are needed. The Commission issued a policy
statement saying that although a defendant plainly might need correc-
tive treatment, a rehabilitation objective should be subordinated to that
of incapacitation if the defendant's age and past history of criminal ac-
tivity suggest a high probability that he will commit further crime and
that he will not be able to complete a sentence of probation successfully
even under close supervision. If, however, a comprehensive program of
supervision in a non-prison setting would reduce substantially the risk
that defendant will break the law, the goal of rehabilitation should
predominate and the defendant should not be imprisoned.
The Need for Punishment. Before it finally cast the defendant catego-
ries, the Sentencing Commission considered a third statutory sentencing
purpose, punishment. The Commission initially decided that five of the
eleven defendant characteristics of section 994(d) appeared relevant to
the need for punishment beyond that required by the simple commis-
sion of the offense. 72 These five included: "(4) mental and emotional
condition to the extent that such condition mitigates the defendant's
culpability or to the extent that such condition is otherwise plainly rele-
vant; (5) physical conditions, including drug dependence;. . . (9) role in
the offense; (10) criminal history"; and "(11) degree of dependence upon
criminal activity for a livelihood."
'73
The Commission noted that two of these five, mental and emo-
tional condition and physical condition, were related to the second cate-
gory of offense criterion, "circumstances under which the offense was
committed which mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense."
'74
Likewise, the defendant's "role in the offense" appeared to be a major
for those imprisoned for other purposes, S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1244-45. Congress simply has
barred the courts from sentencing defendants to prison in order to rehabilitate them.
71 A sentence of probation may incapacitate somewhat if the conditions of probation are
sufficiently restrictive. In such cases, rehabilitation and incapacitation could serve as dual
purposes ofsentencing. Generally, however, the purpose of incapacitation will be served only
through imprisonment. See note 54 supra.
72 Punishment for simple commission of the offense is determined under the category of
offense. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra. Category of defendant criteria may be used
to determine if additional punishment is needed.
73 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(d).
74 Id § 994(c) (2).
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consideration in categorizing the offense2 5 Since these three criteria
had already been considered in deciding how much punishment was
needed under the category of offense, the Commission deemed it inap-
propriate to use them again to justify inflicting additional punishment
because of the category of defendant.
The Commission likewise decided that the second category of of-
fense criteria would subsume the two remaining defendant criteria,
"criminal history" and "degree of dependence upon criminal activity for
a livelihood," when evidence of past criminal conduct or dependency
was probative of the charged crime. In such cases, this evidence should
not be considered a second time in choosing the category of defendant.
On the other hand, if evidence of the defendant's past criminal activity
or dependency was not related to the charged crime, then it would not
be relevant in choosing the category of offense and it could be used to
determine the appropriate category of defendant. In such cases the evi-
dence might indicate a need for increased punishment beyond that re-
quired for simple commission of the charged crime. Operating on this
assumption, the Commission, in creating categories of defendants, issued
a series of policy statements mandating prison sentences when prior
criminal history or obvious dependence on crime for a livelihood ap-
peared, independent of the charged crime, in a sentencing record. For
example, the Commission mandated a prison term for defendants con-
victed of a serious felony during the five years immediately preceding
commission of the charged offense.
76
The Commission, in deciding that prior criminal conduct and de-
pendence on crime for a livelihood merited punishment beyond that
mandated by simple commission of the offense, felt that it was acting
with congressional endorsement. The Code makes clear that in some
cases a defendant's criminal history, standing alone, is enough to war-
rant a substantial term of imprisonment regardless of the severity of the
charged offense. Title III, section 994(h) requires that the sentencing
guidelines mandate
a substantial term of imprisonment for categories of defendants in which
the defendant-
(1) has a history of two or more prior federal, State, or local felony
convictions for offenses committed on different occasions;
(2) committed the offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct
from which he derived a substantial portion of his income;
75 The defendant's role in the offense is directly relevant to the offense severity because
proof of the role in the offense is also proof of the specific offense committed. Further, the role
defendant played may be an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, see note 57, supra, as
when a defendant serves as the leader in a group crime.
76 The Commission defined a "serious felony" as a federal offense classified as greater than
or equivalent to one of high severity or a state offense that is of equivalent magnitude.
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(3) committed the offense in furtherance of a conspiracy with three
or more persons engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity in which the
defendant participated in a managerial or supervisory capacity; or
(4) committed a crime of violence which constitutes a felony while
on release pending trial, sentence, or appeal from a federal, State, or local
felony for which he was ultimately convicted.
7 7
Imprisoning an offender fitting one of these descriptions actually
may serve two of the four statutory purposes of sentencing: incapacita-
tion and punishment.78 If it is predictable that a defendant possessing
the characteristics of one of the section 994(h) categories is likely, solely
by reason of those characteristics, to commit further crimes upon release,
incapacitation by imprisonment seems necessary for society's protection.
If, however, such a prediction is not possible, a prison sentence must be
seen not as incapacitating the defendant but as punishing him, either for
his commission of the charged offense 79 or for his previous transgressions
of the criminal laws.
On the basis of the empirical evidence before it, the Commission
concluded that the categories of defendants described in paragraphs (2)
and (3) of section 994(h) 80 should receive prison sentences primarily for
incapacitation. Those described in paragraphs (1) and (4) should re-
ceive prison sentences primarily as punishment, rather than for the pur-
pose of incapacitation. The Commission reached this conclusion
because it was unable to predict, on the basis of the limited criteria set
forth in paragraphs (1) and (4), that defendants having the enumerated
characteristics are so likely to engage in such further criminal conduct
that incapacitation for the public's protection is justified.
After establishing the various categories of defendant and the pur-
poses of sentencing most relevant to each, the Sentencing Commission
77 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(g).
78 Imposing a prison sentence solely because of an offender's criminal background, when
that background has no probative value in establishing the elements of the charged offense,
does little to advance the purpose of deterring others from committing the charged offense.
Publicizing that individuals received particularly stringent sentences because of their bad
prior records and not because of the charged offense might incidentally deter others like those
individuals who have criminal backgrounds. They might be deterred from committing any
crime by the knowledge that their past history will ensure a sentence to prison. See note 54
supra. On the other hand, those with no prior record would learn that they have one free shot
at committing the charged offense without risking prison. This analysis assumes that a sen-
tence of probation is not a strong deterrent.
79 Section 994(h) criminal conduct may be considered relevant to the charged offense in
two ways. First, the criminal conduct may be probative of the elements of the currently
charged offense. However, the § 994(h) criteria then would be considered under the second
criterion of § 994(c) in categorizing the offense. Second, the § 994(h) criminal conduct,
though not probative of guilt in the current offense, may nonetheless make the current offense
more serious because the defendant was charged with notice that he might receive greater
punishment if convicted of his current crime. See notes 122-23 & accompanying text infra.
80 See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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divided them into two groups. Offenders needing rehabilitative treat-
ment and whose prior criminal conduct is not serious enough to require
incapacitation or imprisonment for punishment beyond simple commis-
sion of the crime, it decided, should receive probation with provision for
the necessary rehabilitative treatment. (The relevant category of of-
fense, however, may still mandate the imposition of a term of imprison-
ment.) Offenders who must be imprisoned for extra punishment or
incapacitation must receive a fixed term, regardless of the sanction man-
dated by the relevant category of offense.
According to the probation officer's presentence investigation re-
port, Advantaged's offender characteristics do not indicate sufficient
likelihood of future criminal conduct to justify incapacitation. Since he
has no criminal history, increased punishment is inappropriate. Accord-
ingly, Advantaged's personal history places him in the first defendant
group, calling for probation with "moderately close" supervision and
rehabilitative treatment.
Disadvantaged clearly needs rehabilitation. However, his
presentence investigation report says that his age, his prior conviction,
and the evidence that he makes at least part of his livelihood from drug
trafficking indicate that he will resort to crime quickly if placed on pro-
bation. Accordingly, he falls into the second group of defendant catego-
ries. The need to protect the public outweighs the need for
rehabilitation, and a prison sentence of sixty to seventy-five months is
prescribed for him. The probation officer indicates the potential appli-
cability of title III, section 994(h)(2), requiring a "substantial term of
imprisonment" for defendants who commit their offense "as part of a
pattern of criminal conduct from which [they derive] a substantial por-
tion of [their] income." He declines to make a recommendation in this
matter, however, since Disadvantaged should nevertheless incur a sub-
stantial prison term under his applicable category of offense. Even if
Disadvantaged meets the section 994(h)(2) specifications, the section's
requirements are already satisfied.
3. Establishing Guidelines for Each Categog of 07Fnse Involving Each
Category of Defendant
In the third step of the guideline formulation process the Commis-
sion must amalgamate offense and defendant categories. The Sentenc-
ing Commission has already declared that anyone convicted of
smuggling drugs in violation of section 1812, under circumstances that
aggravate the offense, must be imprisoned for at least forty months, re-
gardless of his defendant category.8' The Code allows the Commission
81 See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
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to prescribe a "sentencing range" that will leave the sentencing judge
some discretion about the length of the prison term. The maximum of
that sentencing range, however, may not exceed the minimum of the
range by more than twenty-five percent. 82 Accordingly, the Commis-
sion announced a sentencing range of forty to fifty months for simple
commission of the crime.
According to the presentence investigation report, Advantaged's
category of defendant calls for no increased punishment or period of
incapacitation. Therefore, under the guidelines, he should receive only
the sentence mandated by the offense category: imprisonment for a
term of not less than forty and not more than fifty months.8 3 Disadvan-
taged, on the other hand, falls into a defendant category that calls for
incapacitation. He must have a longer term of imprisonment than the
term indicated by the offense severity scale alone. A prison term of sixty
to seventy-five months is prescribed for defendants of his type.
C. THE SENTENCING HEARING
Upon completion of the presentence investigation report, the par-
ties' counsel have an opportunity to see it and confer with the investigat-
ing probation officer about possible corrections and additions.8 4 The
final report is then delivered to the district judge. The judge schedules a
sentencing hearing 8 5 and advises counsel that five days prior to the
hearing they must file their motions for consideration in determining the
appropriate sentence to be imposed.
The order scheduling the sentencing hearing advises counsel that
the hearing is adversarial and each side is entitled to present evidence
and cross-examine witnesses, including the probation officer who con-
ducted the presentence investigation. At the hearing, counsel must fo-
82 "If a sentence specified by the guidelines includes a term of imprisonment, the maxi-
mum of the range established for such term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by
more than 25 percent." S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(b). Technically, the Commission
could choose not to have a range, thus removing the sentencing judge's discretion altogether,
as long as there is no justification under title I, § 2003(b) to depart from the guidelines. See
note 263 & accompanying text infra.
83 This sentence accomplishes the purposes of deterrence and punishment for commission
of the offense.
84 See generally Fennell & Hall, Due Process of Sntencing. An Empirical and Legal Anaysis ofthe
Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1615 (1980).
85 The S. 1722 provisions for guideline application, appellate review, and judicial justifi-
cations for sentences make fact-finding a more important aspect of sentencing under the bill
than it is currently. The need for more fact-finding will lead to more elaborate hearings at
sentencing. The judge will not to be able to pronounce sentence without some form of evi-
dentiary hearing unless both sides agree on the facts stated in the presentence investigation
report, the inferences to be drawn from them, the weight to be given to the relevant criteria,
the applicable guidelines, and the point within the guideline range at which sentence should
be set. Evidentiary hearings at sentencing may be informal.
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cus on the "factors to be considered in imposing a sentence" set forth in
Code title I, section 2003(a).86 The court will entertain evidence, in-
cluding the presentence investigation report,87 concerning "the nature
and circumstances of the offense [for which the defendant now stands
convicted]8 8 and the history and characteristics of the defendant."8 9 In
particular, the order invites counsel to submit evidence responsive to the
category of offense and category of defendant criteria specified in Code
sections 994(c) and (d).
The order further states that the court will consider the four statu-
tory purposes of sentencing: punishment, deterrence, incapacitation
and rehabilitation. 90 Specifically, the court will address two questions:
(1) whether the purposes of punishment and deterrence require that de-
fendant be imprisoned; and (2) whether the defendant needs correc-
tional treatment and, if so, whether he should be placed on probation to
receive the treatment or whether he should be incapacitated for the
public's protection because he is likely to commit further crime while
under probation supervision. 91
The court requests that counsel be prepared to indicate which Sen-
tencing Commission guidelines and policy statements they consider ap-
plicable in the case and whether the court should fashion a sentence
outside the applicable guidelines.92 If couhsel for the government or the
86 See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
87 Section 3714 provides:
Any relevant information concerning the history, characteristics, and conduct of a
person found guilty of an offense may be received and considered by a court of the
United States for the purpose of ascertaining an appropriate sentence to be imposed,
regardless of the admissibility of the information under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
except to the extent that receipt and consideration of such information for purposes of
sentencing is expressly limited by a section of this title relating to sentencing or by any
other federal statute.
S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 3714.
88 The evidence introduced at trial relating to the elements of the § 1812 offense will be
considered part of the record at the sentencing hearing.
89 Id § 2003(a)(1).
90 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 2003(a)(2). The Senate Report indicates that "each of
the four stated purposes should be considered in imposing a sentence in a particular case,
although one purpose may have more bearing on the imposition of sentence in a particular
case than another purpose has." S. REP. No. 96-553 at 934-35. Evidence of the nature and
circumstances of the offense will be relevant to the category of offense and, primarily, to the
sentencing purposes of punishment and deterrence. See notes 55-56 & accompanying text
spra. Evidence of the history and characteristics of the defendant will be relevant to the
category of defendant, and, primarily, to the sentencing purposes of incapacitation and reha-
bilitation. See notes 62-71 & accompanying text supra. Evidence of this history and charac-
teristics of the defendant is also relevant to the purpose of punishment-increased
punishment beyond that required for simple commission of the crime. See notes 72-77 &
accompanying text supra.
91 See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
92 See S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, §§ 2003(a)(4)-(5), 2003(b).
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defendant urges the imposition of a sentence outside the applicable
guidelines, he must point to the existence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances that were "not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines and that should
result in a sentence different from that described" in the guidelines.
93
According to the court, the government has the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence the facts essential to establish the
applicability of the guidelines it advocates.
94
I. The Pre-Hearing Motions
Prior to the sentencing hearing, counsel for Disadvantaged moves
the court to postpone the hearing indefinitely and to release the defend-
ant from the constraints of the order that admitted him to bail. Counsel
contends that the following constitutional and statutory deficiencies
render the sentencing structure of the Code a nullity and preclude the
93 Id § 2003(b).
94 The judge states, however, that the facts recited in the presentence investigation report
will be presumed correct. If it disagrees with the facts recited in the presentence investigation
report, the government must place the report in evidence and then, bearing the burden of
proof, proceed with its rebuttal. If the defendant desires to rebut the facts in the report, he
must go forward with his evidence, although the burden of proof will remain with the govern-
ment. The only time that the defendant will carry the burden of proof is in a confession-
avoidance situation, when the defendant agrees to the facts presented by the government but
seeks to avoid the consequences of these facts. For example, the defendant might agree that
he has prior convictions, but contend that they should not be considered in sentencing be-
cause he lacked the assistance of counsel. In such a case, the defendant would have the bur-
den of proving the lack of counsel in the prior conviction.
Senate Bill 1722 does not address the burden of proof in sentence hearings. The House
Bill, H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., tit. III, § 3105(c)(l)-(2) (1980), provides as follows:
(c) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, in a hearing under
this subsection, a party alleging a fact shall be required to prove such fact by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.
(2) In a hearing under this section-
(A) no fact proved at trial or established as a result of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere may be disputed by any party;
(B) The Government shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of
any previous criminal conviction of the defendant referred to in the presentence report
or otherwise relied on by the Government;
(C) any factual statement (other than a statement of the existence of previous
criminal convictions of the defendant) in the presentence report shall be presumed to
be true, except that if the defendant offers credible evidence to controvert such state-
ment, the Government shall be required to prove the fact involved by a preponder-
ance of the evidence;
(D) the court may consider any information concerning the history, characteris-
tics, and conduct of the defendant that is relevant to the sentencing decision, unless
such consideration is otherwise prohibited by law; and
(E) the court shall assure that any finding of fact by the court that negates a
factual statement in the presentence report is made a part of such report.
A byproduct of putting the burden of proof on the prosecutor is that he will have an
increased incentive to see that the presentence investigation report is accurate, including the
information he furnishes the probation officer. See also Fennell & Hall, supra note 84.
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court from imposing any sentence in the case. Advantaged joins in the
motion, although some of the arguments Disadvantaged makes are in-
apposite in his case.
The Alleged Constitutional Deficiencies-Due Process Objections. Dis-
advantaged first claims that the Code sections requiring the Sentencing
Commission to consider the need for incapacitation in drawing up
guidelines and policy statements,9 5 and requiring the court to consider
the need for incapacitation in sentencing,96 unconstitutionally deny due
process both on their face and as applied. First, he argues, incapacita-
tion is unconstitutional as a purpose of sentencing: sentencing someone
to prison in order "to protect the public from [his] further crimes" '97 is
equivalent to imprisoning him for crimes he has not yet committed.
Since he has not been indicted for these crimes, and since his guilt has
not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, he cannot, consistently
with the due process clause, be deprived of his liberty for their commis-
sion. Disadvantaged points out that if the guidelines recommended in
the presentence investigation report are adopted, he may receive from
ten to twenty-five months more imprisonment than Advantaged, solely
because of the crimes it is believed he will commit in the future.98
Second, he argues, even if it is constitutional to sentence for the
95 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, §§ 994(a)(2) & (g).
96 Id tit. I, § 2003(a)(2)(B).
97 Id
98 Disadvantaged acknowledges that imprisoning for the purpose of incapacitation is not
a new concept. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 7.03-.04 (1962); MODEL SENTENCING ACT
§ 1, Comment (1972); R. DAWSON, SENTENCING 80 (1969). He states, however, that in the
past, offenders seldom could know whether they were being sentenced specifically for incapac-
itation or for other purposes. See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 20; S. REP. No. 96-553 at
915, 921. The new Code, however, specifically requires that offenders meeting certain criteria
be sentenced for the purpose of incapacitation and that sentencing judges "state in open court
the reasons for . . . imposition of the particular sentence." S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I,
§ 2003(c). Disadvantaged claims that when incapacitation is clearly the purpose for impris-
oning a defendant, or increasing his term of imprisonment, the sentence cannot bear constitu-
tional scrutiny.
Many scholars have discussed incapacitation as a purpose of sentencing in general terms
of "fairness." See, e.g., N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 58-84 (1974); A. VON
HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 5, 19-26, 84-88, 124-3 1; Coffee, The Repressed Issues ofSentencing: Ac-
countabilily, Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975,
1001-08 (1978); Underwood, supra note 64, at 1409-20, 1425-26; von Hirsch, Prediction of Crimi-
nal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717, passim
(1972). Others have speculated about the constitutionality of this practice. See, e.g., A. VON
HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 25-26; Coffee, supra at 1001 n.69; Ervin, Foreword- Preventive Deten-
tion-A Step Backward for Criminal Justice, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291, 298 (1971); von
Hirsch, supra at 717; Cohen, The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment: A Critical Review of
the Literature, 188-89 (commissioned paper, Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, Center for Studies
of Crime and Delinquency). See also Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World
ofJohn Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371 (1970).
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purpose of incapacitation, it is only constitutional to deprive one of his
liberty for this purpose if the evidence that he will commit future crimes
is highly reliable. 9 9 No one has yet discovered a device that can predict
future criminal conduct without a very wide margin of error. 10 0 Thus,
the method of categorization undertaken by the Commission can only
be viewed as arbitrary and a denial of due process. 0 1
99 See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 25-26.
100 Experts generally agree that efforts to predict future crime accurately have not been
successful. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, supra note 98, at 62-72; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 21-
26; Coffee, supra note 98, at 993-95; Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness. Some Fictions About
Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 24, 32 (1971); Monahan & Monahan, Prediction Research and the
Role of Pychologists in Correctional Institutions, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1028, 1029-30 (1977);
Partridge, Soc. ScI. & SENTENCING, Mar. 10, 1980, at 2, 9-11; Underwood, supra note 64, at
1409-12; Cohen, supra note 98, at 189. Defendants cite Professor Andrew von Hirsch in his
frequently quoted discussion of the "false positives" problem. "False positives" are persons
mistakenly predicted to commit further crime. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 21. Accord-
ing to von Hirsch:
The tendency to overpredict derives from the comparative rarity of the conduct to
be predicted. Serious crimes are, statistically speaking, infrequent events; and the rarer
the event, the greater will be the incidence of false positives. Thus:
Methods of predicting criminal behavior, whether clinical or statistical, are blunt
instruments. Unlike the incipient tubercular, the potential recidivist does not carry eas-
ily spotted symptoms of his condition; the predictor has to rely on correlations between
offenders' currently observed characteristics and any subsequent criminal behavior on
their part. The data will necessarily be crude: only grossly observable characteristics of
the offender population can ordinarly be identified; and the measurement of outcome-
subsequent criminal conduct-is notoriously unreliable, given the problems of unde-
tected violations and selective enforcement.
If the conduct to be predicted occurs rarely in the sample, the crudity of these inputs
takes its toll. With a predictive instrument of so little discernment and a target popula-
tion so small, the forecaster will be able to spot a significant percentage of the actual
violators only ifa large number offalse positives is also included. The process resembles trying
to hit a small bull's-eye with a blunderbuss: to strike the center of the target with any of
the shot, the marksman will have to allow most of his discharge to hit outside it.
This has been confirmed in a 1971 study of violent crimes by the criminologists
Ernst Wenk, James Robison, and Robert Emrich. Their study concerned a group of
youthful offenders who had been committed to the California Youth Authority. Since
nearly one quarter of the youths in the sample had a history of violent behavior, the
potential in this group for new violence was expected to be high. Their behavior on
parole was followed up for a period of fifteen months after their release from confine-
ment, with a view to determining how many were returned for assaultive offenses. The
investigators found that the incidence of violent recidivism during the fifteen-month fol-
low-up period was only 2.4 percent. A rate that low could be expected to yield a large
number of false positives--and that is precisely what happened. The investigators re-
quested a psychologist and a statistician to develop predictive indices for violent recidi-
vism, based upon the data in their sample. The less pessimistic projection-the
psychologist's-was that a predictive instrument could be developed from the data
which could identify about one half of the true positives-but in which the false positives
outnumbered the true by a discouraging eight to one.
Id at 22-24 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original). See N. MORRIS, supra note 98, at 67-72;
Dershowitz, supra, at 31-32; von Hirsch, supra note 98, at 723. See also Ervin, supra note 98, at
298; Hoffman, supra note 5, at 290-93; Tribe, supra note 98,passim; Note, Procedural Due Process
at Judicial Sentencingfor Felony, 81 HARV. L. REv. 821, 825 (1968).
101 According to Disadvantaged, when the "medical model" of sentencing and parole deci-
sionmaking was still in effect, see notes 232-34 & accompanying text infa, the effects of miscal-
culating a defendant's propensity toward future crime were not so severe. The Parole
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Disadvantaged claims that title III, section 994(h), which requires
that defendants with certain types of criminal background receive a sub-
stantial term of imprisonment regardless of their offense, 102 is likewise
unconstitutional to the extent that its purpose is incapacitation. Subsec-
tion (2) of that provision mandates a substantial term of imprisonment
for an offender who committed his offense "as part of a pattern of crimi-
nal conduct from which he derived a substantial portion of his income."
The court might rely on this requirement to increase Disadvantaged's
term of imprisonment. 10 3 Disadvantaged notes that the Commission de-
clared that the purpose of this subsection, as well as of subsection (3)
(dealing with offenders serving as leaders of conspiracies), is incapacita-
tion.10
4
Disadvantaged also claims that sections 994(h) (2) and (3)105 uncon-
stitutionally deny due process because they require imprisonment for
past criminal conduct that has never resulted in an indictment, trial,
and conviction. The offender's pattern of criminal conduct or conspira-
torial activity is immaterial to the charged offense, he argues, or else it
would be covered under the "category of offense" section of the stat-
ute.'0 6 Section 994(h) clearly deals only with categories of defendants,
Commission, monitoring an offender's progress toward rehabilitation, could correct a mis-
taken prediction by adjusting his date of release on parole. Since the medical model no
longer exists, however, see text following note 253 infra, that safeguard is gone.
Disadvantaged adds that if the predictive device fails for want of empirical justification,
a defendant will be incapacitated not because he poses a threat of further crime but because
of his personal characteristics. This, he says, amounts to a denial of equal protection. The
classification is not justifiable. But see Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing
Process, 84 YALE LJ. 810, 874-75 (1975).
102 See notes 78-79 & accompanying text supra.
103 See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra. Disadvantaged argues that he might fall into
the section 994(h) (2) category directly. Even if he does not, the existence of that category has
probably influenced the Commission to give the § 994(d) defendant characteristic, "degree of
dependence on criminal activity for a livelihood," special weight in determining the need for
incapacitation.
104 See text accompanying note 79 supra. Disadvantaged also points to the legislative his-
tory of the Code, which states that § 994(h) was based on 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976). S. REP.
No. 96-553 at 1244. That statute clearly indicates that its purpose for enhancing the
sentences of "dangerous special offenders" is incapacitation: "A defendant is dangerous for
purposes of this section if a period of confinement longer than that provided for such felony is
required for the protection of the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant." 18
U.S.C. § 3575() (1976).
105 Under these sections, the Commission must ensure a substantial term of imprisonment
for the defendant who: "(2) committed the offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct
from which he derived a substantial portion of his income" or "(3) committed the offense in
furtherance of a conspiracy with three or more persons engaging in a pattern of racketeering
activity in which the defendant participated in a managerial or supervisory capacity." S.
1722, supra note 12, tit. III, §§ 994(h)(2) & (3).
106 For instance, such matters, if relevant, would be considered circumstances aggravating
the seriousness of the offense. Id § 994(c) (2). In any case, defendants argue, if conspiracy or
pattern of criminal conduct were material to the offense, it should not be used both to increase
GERALD BARD TOFLA T [Vol. 72
and conspiracy and pattern of criminal conduct are considered in the
994(h) context only as defendant characteristics. Since pattern of crimi-
nal conduct and conspiracy are thus divorced from the crime itself, im-
prisonment, to the extent it is increased under section 994(h), is for the
offender's past conduct standing alone. The increased imprisonment is
not explainable as somehow enhancing the severity of the charged of-
fense.10 7 Since the offenders have never been indicted, tried, or con-
victed for this past conduct, section 994(h) requires imprisonment
without due process. 108
Disadvantaged adds that the last two criteria of the section 994(d)
defendant characteristics, criminal history and degree of dependence on
criminal activity for a livelihood, are also unconstitutional for the same
reasons: they do not relate to the charged offense, and yet they can lead
to incapacitation and increased punishment.10 9 Further, he argues, to
the extent that hearsay information helps to establish the past criminal
conduct of section 994(h) (2) and (3) or section 994(d) at the sentencing
hearing, defendants are denied their constitutional right to confront wit-
nesses.110 Disadvantaged admits that'the Supreme Court has rejected
this kind of objection in the past, 1 but argues that the new Code casts a
the offense severity and to require that the offender receive a greater sentence because of his
status.
107 See United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1173 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977); A. VON HIRSCH,
supra note 5, at 84-88; Underwood, supra note 64, at 1418-19.
108 Several circuit courts of appeal have addressed the issue of the degree of due process
required in sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976), the statute on which section 994(h) was
based. S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1224. Though at least two of these courts have expressed some
reservations, they have held that sentencing under § 3575 does not require all of the due
process rights that arise in the trial itself, such as trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, when evidence of past criminal conduct is introduced. See United States v. William-
son, 567 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ilacqua, 562 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160; United States v. Neary,
552 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 864 (1977); United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d
326 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).
109 See notes 67-68, 77 & accompanying text supra.
110 U.S. CONST. amend VI. Disadvantaged acknowledges that under title I, § 3714 of the
Code,
[a]ny relevant information concerning the history, characteristics, and conduct of a per-
son found guilty of an offense may be received and considered by a court of the United
States for the purpose of ascertaining an appropriate sentence to be imposed, regardless
of the admissibility of the information under the Federal Rules of Evidence ....
S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 3714. He contends, however, that this statute cannot abolish
the right of confrontation.
1i1 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). But see Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S.
605, 608 (1967). In Specht a statute subjecting sex offenders to separate proceedings that could
lead to an indeterminate term of one day to life without the right to a hearing was held
unconstitutional. According to the Supreme Court,
The Sex Offenders Act does not make the commission of a specified crime the basis for
sentencing. It makes one conviction the basis for commencing another proceeding under
another Act to determine whether a person constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the
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different light on the situation. In the past, he alleges, sentencing courts
allowed hearsay evidence of prior criminal conduct not resulting in a
conviction because it was relevant to rehabilitation, a primary purpose
of imprisoning defendants at that time.1 12 Under sections 994(h) and
994(d), however, courts consider prior criminal activity in connection
with punishment and incapacitation, not just rehabilitation."t 3 Indeed,
rehabilitation can never be the purpose for sentencing defendants fitting
the section 994(h)(2) and (3) categories, because section 994(h) requires
imprisonment, and rehabilitation can never be a reason for imprison-
ment.1 14 When the court hears evidence of prior criminal activity for
the express purpose of punishment or incapacitation, Disadvantaged ar-
gues, the right of confrontation should attach." 15 To the extent that title
I, section 3714 allows introduction of hearsay evidence for either pur-
pose, therefore, that section is unconstitutional.
Disadvantaged next argues that use of any of the defendant cate-
gory criteria of section 994(d) to impose or increase a prison sentence
public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill. That is a new finding of fact. . that
was not an ingredient of the offense charged.
Id The offender must receive full due process protection in this new inquiry. Disadvantaged
argues that the Code's sentencing scheme is closer to that in Spechl than to that in Williams
and thus full due process rights should be observed. He also claims that Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1977) is relevant. In that case the Supreme Court held it a denial of due
process for a court to consider confidential information, which was included in a presentence
investigation report but not disclosed to defendant, in imposing a sentence to death. Accord-
ing to defendants, Gardner weakens the influence of Williams and indicates a growing concern
for ensuring the accuracy of information considered at sentencing. Disadvantaged concedes,
however, that Gardner did not overturn Williams. Further, it is not likely that the rule of
Gardner would apply in cases in which the death penalty is not considered.
112 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 248-249; S. REP. No. 96-553 at 912.
113 See notes 64-77 & accompanying text supra. See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 20:
"Historically, the idea of predictive restraint was linked to rehabilitation: the offender was to
be treated-but, if likely to offend again, would be isolated from the community while receiv-
ing treatment. Recently, however, the notion is coming to stand on its own."
114 See note 23 supra.
115 Disadvantaged provides the following illustration of his point: X is convicted of a class
A misdemeanor. The applicable category of offense calls for a sentence to probation. At his
sentencing, however, the prosecutor presents the testimony of an F.B.I. agent, who says that X
committed a serious crime in the recent past, but due to technicalities, the government has
not been able to bring charges against him. This statement is the only evidence offered con-
cerning this past crime. In light of this testimony, however, the court finds that X belongs to
a category of defendant that falls into guidelines requiring incapacitation or enhanced pun-
ishment. Accordingly, the court sentences X to a term of imprisonment.
Y is formally charged with committing the same crime which the F.B.I. agent testified
that X had committed. Before conviction and sentencing, however, he is entitled to confron-
tation of witnesses against him, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and all the other constitu-
tional guarantees of due process.
Disadvantaged maintains that both individuals are, in effect, sentenced to prison for
committing the same crime. One, however, received the benefit of full due process protection
while the other did not. Disadvantaged contends that there is no justification for this differ-
ent treatment.
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denies due process. He contends that the Code incarcerates individuals
for their personal characteristics rather than for overt conduct. " '[T]he
criminal law ought to be presented to the citizen in such a form that he
can mold his conduct by it, that he can, in short, obey it.' Due process
forbids punishment that one has no assured way to avoid."'
116
Finally, Disadvantaged contends that the section 994(d) defendant
characteristics, prior criminal history and degree of dependence on
criminal activity for a livelihood, as well as the 994(h)(2) and (3) catego-
ries, are unconstitutionally vague. Since these provisions could all result
in an increased prison term, offenders have a right to prior notice of
their substance. Likewise, the purpose of "protecting the public" is un-
constitutionally vague. It is not at all clear, Disadvantaged argues,
when an offender is "dangerous."
' 17
The Alleged Constitutional Defciencies-DoubleJeopard Objections. Sub-
sections (1) and (4) of title III, section 994(h) require sentencing a de-
fendant to a substantial term of imprisonment if he: "(1) has a history
of two or more prior federal, State, or local felony convictions for of-
fenses committed on different occasions"; or if he "(4) committed a
crime of violence which constitutes a felony while on release pending
trial, sentence, or appeal from a federal, State, or local felony for which
he was ultimately convicted." Although neither Advantaged nor Disad-
vantaged falls into these categories, they nonetheless seek to attack the
provisions 18 as violative of the double jeopardy clause. 119 In effect, they
argue, these section 994(h) provisions require punishment for crimes for
which the defendants have already been tried, convicted, and sentenced.
Since they have already served a sentence for these past crimes, subject-
ing them to extra punishment in later proceedings because of the prior
convictions subjects them to double jeopardy.
Defendants renew their contention that considerations under sec-
tion 994(h) relate only to the defendant and are not relevant to the
charged offense. 120 They further note that the Commission has stated
116 Tribe, supra note 98, at 395 (quoting L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 105 (1964)).
See also A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 124-25. Seegeneral.v Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App.
D.C. 229 (1900). But see Project, supra note 101, at 876-77.
117 See United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874, 884-85 (W.D. Mo. 1974), afdon other
grounds, 529 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1975).
118 Defendants contend that although neither of them could fall into those categories, they
nonetheless may challenge them because the alleged double jeopardy problems, along with
the other constitutional infirmities they have found, combine to render the whole Code sen-
tencing scheme unenforceable. See notes 143-47 & accompanying text infra.
119 "[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
120 See notes 106-07 & accompanying text supra.
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that subsections (1) and (4) are to be considered for the purpose of in-
creased punishment beyond that required for simple commission of the
crime.121 While defendants acknowledge that the Supreme Court has
refuted arguments that consideration of prior convictions in sentencing
constitutes double jeopardy, 122 they argue that the Court's reasoning
cannot apply in the context of the new Code. The Court stated that
offenders were not subjected to double jeopardy because an increased
sentence due to prior convictions "is not to be viewed as either a new
jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes. It is a stiffened
penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated
offense because a repetitive one." 123 Pointing to the structure of the new
Code, defendants claim that the enhanced punishment for prior convic-
tions is relevant only to the defendant category, completely apart from
the currently charged offense.124
In addition, defendants claim that consideration of the section
994(d) defendant criterion, "criminal history," also violates the double
jeopardy clause insofar as it requires consideration of prior convictions
in deciding if punishment should be increased beyond that required for
simple commission of the offense. 125 Disadvantaged claims that if the
court considers his prior conviction for possession of drugs in placing
him in a category of defendant, he may be subjected to increased pun-
ishment for his past crime and thus to double jeopardy.
The AllegedStalutoy Deftiencies. In addition to his constitutional ob-
jections to the sentencing provisions of the new Code, Disadvantaged
raises several objections concerning the statute's internal structure. He
first objects that by requiring imprisonment for a defendant who poses a
threat to society while proscribing imprisonment for the purpose of re-
habilitation, the Code's sentencing scheme is in irreconcilable conflict.
Implicit in the decision to incapacitate a defendant is the assumption
that upon his eventual release, he will be rehabilitated; for the justice
121 See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
122 See, e.g., Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227, 231 (1980) (per curiam) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (Powell, J., dissenting); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948). Seegeneral/f A.
VON HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 84-88.
123 Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. at 732.
124 Otherwise, they argue, the § 994(h) considerations would be included in the "category
of offense" criteria. See S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(c). See text accompanying notes
106-07 supra.
125 See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra. Defendants illustrate their claim by re-
minding the court that the Sentencing Commission, in considering the relevance of "criminal
history" to the statutory purpose of punishment, formulated a policy statement requiring a
prison sentence for defendants convicted of a serious felony during the five-year period imme-
diately preceding the commission of the charged offense. See text accompanying note 76
supra •
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system will not release him until he no longer poses a threat to society.
Therefore, Disadvantaged argues, to the extent that a sentence is
designed to achieve society's protection, it also is designed to achieve the
defendant's rehabilitation, and vice versa. A sentence for one of these
purposes is implicitly a sentence for the other purpose. 126 Since the
Code will not permit the imprisonment of a defendant for the purpose of
rehabilitation, 2 7 it follows that a defendant likewise cannot be impris-
oned for the purpose of incapacitation. Since incapacitation, as a rule,
cannot be achieved by means other than imprisonment,1 28 the sections
of the Code requiring the Sentencing Commission and the court to sen-
tence for the purpose of protecting the public from the defendant1 29 are
unenforceable.
The defendants also state that title III, section 994(d) requires the
Sentencing Commission's guidelines and policy statements to be "en-
tirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed and socioeco-
nomic status of offenders." The section 994(d) offender criteria 130 that
the Commission must take into account in formulating categories of de-
fendants, however, are not neutral as to these characteristics. 3 1 Use of
these criteria, according to defendants, necessarily produces defendant
categories that correlate substantially with racial and socioeconomic sta-
tus. For instance, a disproportionate number of persons with a low so-
cioeconomic status will be found to need rehabilitation because they
lack education and vocational skills and have poor employment records.
Likewise, persons of low socioeconomic status are more likely to depend
on their criminal activity for a livelihood. For this reason a court will
126 Disadvantaged cites the following statement by Zebulon R. Brockway as illustrative of
the link between the concepts of rehabilitation and incapacitation:
No man, be he judge, lawyer or layman, can determine beforehand the date when im-
prisonment shall work reformation in any case, and it is an outrage upon society to
return to the privileges of citizenship those who have proved themselves dangerous and
bad by the commission of crime, until a cure is wrought and reformation reached ...
Therefore. . . sentences should not be determinate, but inidetermmiate. By this is meant
(to state briefly) that allpersons in a state, who are convicted of crimes or ofenses before a competent
court, shall be deemed wards of the state, and shall be committed to the custody of the board ofguardi-
ans, until, in theirjdgment, they may be returned to society with ordinary safety, and in accord with
their own highest we/fare.
Brockway, The Ideal of a True Prison System for a State, in TRANSACTIONS 54 (Nat'l Cong. on
Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline, 1870) (emphasis in original).
127 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 9940).
128 See note 54 & accompanying text supra.
129 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, §§ 994(a)(2), 9 9 4(g); id tit. I, § 2003(a)(2)(B).
130 See text accompanying note 60 supra.
131 Defendants state that in many cases their claim is self-evident. For instance, education,
vocational skills, and previous employment record obviously are related to socioeconomic sta-
tus. They also cite studies indicating that several of the eleven § 994(d) offender criteria are




find them in need of incapacitation more often than those of a higher
socioeconomic status. Since the section 994(d) criteria are not neutral,
defendants conclude, the statute itself prohibits the Commission from
utilizing them, or any criteria like them, to devise categories of defend-
ants. But without the statutory guidance provided by section 994(d),
the Commission is helpless to formulate a guideline for "each category
of offense involving each category of defendant" as the Code requires,
and thus the statute is, by its own commands, unworkable.
The Alleged Deficiencies in the Guidelines and Policy Statements. Parallel-
ing his due process objection,132 Disadvantaged contends that the par-
ticular Sentencing Commission guideline cited in the presentence
investigation report and presumably applicable to his case has an insuf-
ficient evidentiary foundation. He does not challenge the Commission's
classification of the section 1812 drug smuggling offense, committed
under the circumstances of his case, as one of very high severity. He
objects, rather, to the Commission's decision to categorize offenders with
histories and characteristics such as his as persons who must be incapaci-
tated for society's protection. According to Disadvantaged, the evidence
on which the Commission's decision was based does not reasonably per-
mit the inference that he will commit more crimes unless he is removed
from society.133 If the category of defendant in question is given effect
in the face of this deficiency, the category, and the guidelines that incor-
porate it, will operate to deny him due process as well as equal protec-
tion of the law. The categorization will be arbitrary, and
Disadvantaged and others like him will be sentenced not because they
are thought likely to commit more crime but solely because of their
backgrounds and personal characteristics. 134
Defendants also object to the Commission's interpretation and im-
plementation of the Code's goal of sentencing for the purpose of punish-
ment. Title I, section 2003(a)(2)(C) directs the court to consider
whether the sentence imposes "just punishment for the offense." Title
III requires the Sentencing Commission to promulgate guidelines 135 and
policy statements136 in such a way as to "assure just punishment for
132 See text accompanyinig notes 99-101 supra.
133 Disadvantaged reminds the court that the Commission could only use six of the
§ 994(d) criteria to make its prediction: age, mental and emotional condition, physical condi-
tion, role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of dependence on criminal activity for a
livelihood. S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(d). See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
134 See U.S. ex rel Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921
(1976).
135 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, §§ 994(a)(I)-(2).
136 Id § 994(a)(2).
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[conduct defined as a federal offense].' 3 7 In both instances, defendants
claim, the statutory language clearly indicates that the punishment is
for "the offense" only. According to defendants, "the offense" consists of
all the operative facts and circumstances of the crime itself. The ele-
ments of the offense-specific intent, particular overt acts, etc.---deter-
mine what facts are relevant for punishment. By definition, "the
offense" does not embrace extrinsic prior criminal conduct, whether or
not reduced to a conviction, that is not probative of the elements of the
charged offense.
Nevertheless the Commission, in devising categories of defendants,
has found the defendant criteria, "criminal history" and "degree of de-
pendence on crime for a livelihood,"' 38 to be relevant to the purpose of
punishment. 139 Since these considerations are not probative of the
charged offense, t40 defendants argue, the Commission has exceeded its
statutory authority. Resulting guidelines and policy statements that call
for punishment beyond that required for simple commission of the of-
fense, when the last two defendant criteria are met, therefore, are invalid
and must be stricken.
Finally, defendants argue that all guideline ranges prescribing im-
prisonment are illegal under the Code because they impermissibly in-
clude considerations of the need for rehabilitation. While title III,
section 9940) forbids the Commission from making the need for rehabil-
itation a reason for a sentence to prison absent extraordinary circum-
stances, section 994(1) requires as follows:
The Commission in initially promulgating guidelines for particular
categories of cases, shall be guided by the average sentences imposed in
such categories of cases prior to the creation of the Commission, and in
cases involving sentences to terms of imprisonment, the length of such
terms actually served, unless the Commission determines that such a
length of term of imprisonment does not adequately reflect a basis for a
sentencing range that is consistent with the purposes of sentencing de-
scribed in subsection 101 (b) of title 18, United States Code.
Defendants note that until the Code was passed, sentences to prison fre-
quently were imposed for the purpose of rehabilitation.' 4 ' To the extent
137 Id. tit. I, § 1O1(b)(3).
138 Id tit. III, § 994(d).
139 Defendants concede that Congress included similar criteria in § 994(h), and that
§ 994(h) was apparently intended to serve the purpose of punishment. They argue, however,
that § 994(h) is separate from these section 994(d) offender characteristics, and that while
Congress intended to provide extra punishment for past crimes in section 994(h), it did not
intend for the Commission to prescribe, through use of the defendant criteria of section
994(d), extra punishment beyond that required for simple commission of the crime.
140 If they were probative of the charged offense, defendants argue, they would be included
in the category of offense criteria, rather than the category of defendant criteria.
141 See note 112 & accompanying text supra.
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that the Commission is guided by these past sentences in promulgating
its guidelines, the finished guidelines prescribing imprisonment will re-
flect consideration of the need for rehabilitation.142 Under section
994(j), these guidelines, including the ones applying to Advantaged and
Disadvantaged, must be considered void.
The Relief Sought. Defendants submit that the foregoing constitu-
tional and statutory infirmities of the Code's sentencing scheme pre-
clude the formation and imposition of guidelines. Congress plainly
intended that the Sentencing Commission guidelines and policy state-
ments circumscribe and sharply define the courts' exercise of discretion
in the performance of the sentencing function. If the statutory direc-
tions for formulating those guidelines are a nullity, the Commission is
powerless to perform its guideline-drawing function. In that case the
only guidance for the courts lies in the general "authorized sentences"
for probation, 143 fines, 144 and imprisonment 145 and three of the four
purposes of sentencing-punishment, deterrence, and rehabilita-
142 According to defendants, the Commission's problem is enhanced if the § 994(0 require-
ment that the Commission avoid "unwarranted disparity" in establishing guidelines is inter-
preted to include disparity between sentences under the prior law and sentences under the
Code.
143 S. 1722 provides: "(b) Authorized Terms.-The authorized terms of probation are-
(1) for a felony, not less than one nor more than five years; (2) for a misdemeanor, not more
than two years; and (3) for an infraction, not more than one year." S. 1722, supra note 12, tit.
I, § 2101(b).
144 S. 1722 provides:
(6) Authorized Fines-Except as otherwise provided, the authorized fines are-
(1) if the defendant is an individual-
(A) for a felony, or for a misdemeanor resulting in the loss of human life, not
more than $250,000;
(B) for any other misdemeanor, not more than $25,000; and
(C) for an infraction, not more than $1,000; and
(2) if the defendant is an organization-
(A) for a felony, or for a misdemeanor resulting in the loss of human life, not
more than $1,000,000;
(B) for any other misdemeanor, not more than $100,000; and
(C) for an infraction, not more than $10,000.
Id § 2201(b).
145 S. 1722 provides:
(b) Authorized Terms.-The authorized terms of imprisonment are-
(1) for a Class A felony, the duration of the defendant's life or any period of
time;
(2) for a Class B felony, not more than twenty years;
(3) for a Class C felony, not more than ten years;
(4) for a Class D felony, not more than five years;
(5) for a Class E felony, not more than two years;
(6) for a Class A misdemeanor, not more than one year;
(7) for a Class B misdemeanor, not more than six months;
(8) f6r a Class C misdemeanor, not more than thirty days; and
(9) for an infraction, not more than five days.
Id § 2301(b).
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tion' 4 6-- prescribed by the statute.' 4 7 Accordingly, the court cannot
perform the sentencing function in this case, and the defendants, though
they stand convicted of the offense charged, must be discharged.
2. The Courts Rulings
The Court directs the government to file a written response to the
defendants' motions and postpones the sentencing hearing. Following
the parties' exchange of legal memoranda, the court hears argument of
counsel and then issues a memorandum order denying the defendants'
motions.
The court initially addresses the issue of standing. The government
has objected that Advantaged, and, in some cases, Disadvantaged, lack
standing to raise their constitutional and statutory interpretation objec-
tions because they cannot show harm from the alleged defects. The de-
fendants respond by claiming that the alleged defects are so pervasive
that the sentencing scheme as a whole is incapable of application. The
court defers ruling on this issue and states that after the sentencing hear-
ing it will decide whether the sentences can be fashioned without caus-
ing prejudice to the defendants. The court then turns its attention to
the alleged deficiencies.
The district court prefaces its rulings by observing that many of the
new Code's problems arise from the very feature that makes it attrac-
tive. Its specificity, designed to assure uniformity and fairness, renders it
vulnerable to attack. In the past, challenges to the sentencing process
were relatively rare and seldom successful. There was no right of appeal
from sentences within the statutory range, and it was difficult, if not
impossible, to ascertain and prove the motivation and reasoning process
of the judge.' 48 In contrast, by setting forth explicit factors the Sentenc-
146 Incapacitation, defendants claim, is unconstitutional as a purpose of sentencing. See
note 97 & accompanying text supra.
147 Defendants also note that without guidelines, appellate rights cannot be exercised.
Under the Code, both the government and the defendant have the absolute right to appellate
review of sentences imposed outside the guidelines. S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, §§ 3725(a)-
(b). Both parties also have the right, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b)(2), as
amended, to move the sentencing court to correct a sentence allegedly imposed through incor-
rect application of the Commission's guidelines. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (2), as amended by the
Code, S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. II, § 1I1(t). Further, both parties may petition for leave to
appeal the district court's disposition of such a motion. S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I,
§§ 3723(b), 3724(d). Without a guideline structure, appellate rights, rule 35(b)(2), and its
concomitant review procedures are all rendered meaningless.
148 As is noted in the Senate report, judges have sentenced defendants for a variety of
purposes, S. REP. No. 96-553 at 915, 921, and since they have not been required to state those
purposes, they have seldom done so. Id at 921. Certainly the "system" has not encouraged
judicial disclosure of the purposes behind sentences. Most sentences set within the legislative
range are unreviewable. By stating the purpose behind the sentence, the judge may be pro-
viding the defendant with a legislatively unanticipated means to gain appellate review.
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ing Commission and the courts must consider in establishing and apply-
ing guidelines, and by requiring these sentencing authorities to state the
particular factors they find relevant in each case, 149 the Code provides
defendants a unique opportunity to "read the minds" of the sentencing
authorities and to dissect each component of their reasoning process. By
setting forth concrete factors that must be considered, the Code invites
challenges to the reliability and constitutionality of each. Likewise, the
Code invites challenge by setting forth distinguishable sentencing pur-
poses and mandating apportionment of sentences, according to purpose.
In short, the Code's explicit step-by-step breakdown of the sentencing
process forces courts to face squarely for the first time the implications of
traditional sentencing practices.
The court then acknowledges that Disadvantaged's constitutional
objections present several close questions. It indicates considerable con-
cern over the validity of incapacitation as a statutory purpose of sen-
tencing. 150 Further, it seriously questions whether it would be
constitutional for a court to sentence a defendant to prison or to an in-
creased term of imprisonment solel'y on the basis of a prediction that the
defendant will injure society by committing additional crimes if given
his freedom.151 The court also questions the constitutionality of basing
that prediction on an assessment of the defendant's past criminal history
and the histories of others like the defendant, established by hearsay, at
a sentencing hearing.152
The court expresses concern, as well, about the constitutional pro-
priety of imposing an extra measure of punishment, beyond that re-
quired for simple commission of the crime, soley because of the
defendant's history of previous criminal conduct unrelated to the
charged offense.' 53 The court acknowledges the Supreme Court prece-
dent allowing a sentencing judge to consider a defendant's past criminal
conduct in fashioning a prison sentence, 154 but observes that the cases
149 Title I, § 2003(c) requires the judge to state in open court his reasons for imposing a
particular sentence. Section 2003(b) requires judges to consider whether the Commission
took particular aggravating or mitigating circumstances into consideration in formulating its
guidelines. Judges may impose a sentence outside the guidelines only if they find that the
Commission failed to consider, in developing the guidelines, an important circumstance re-
vealed at the sentencing hearing. These requirements imply that, to facilitate this inquiry,
the Sentencing Commission must disclose its reasoning process in formulating the guidelines.
15o See note 97 & accompanying text supra.
151 Ste notes 99-104 & accompanying text supra. See A. voN HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 20-2 1.
152 See note 110 & accompanying text supra.
153 See notes 106-08 & accompanying text supra.
154 See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241. While the'Court has prohibited such consideration of prior convictions in which the
defendant was not represented by counsel, this prohibition appears to be based primarily on a
desire to protect from erosion the rule of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See, e.g.,
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creating this precedent invariably involved sentencing schemes in which
a defendant could be imprisoned for rehabilitative purposes, as well as
for punishment and deterrence. 155 Under these schemes, courts consid-
ered prior criminal history highly relevant in determining whether a de-
fendant needed correctional treatment and, if so, whether that
treatment should be administered on probation or in prison. Since the
sentencing judge was not required to articulate his reasons for fashion-
ing a particular sentence, and since his exercise of sentencing discretion
was virtually unreviewable, it was seldom clear whether he considered
the defendant's criminal history only as it related to the need for reha-
bilitative treatment or whether he used it as a basis for imposing an
extra measure of punishment. Although it may be appropriate to con-
sider criminal history in the former instance, 156 its use in the later in-
stance leads inexorably to questions of due process and double jeopardy.
An enhanced sentence predicated on criminal conduct not reduced to a
conviction might be equated to punishment for crimes for which a de-
fendant was not charged or convicted-an obvious deprivation of due
process. 157 Increased punishment based on prior convictions might be
equated to punishment for crimes for which the defendant has already
served a sentence-a clear infringement of the right against double jeop-
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448-49 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115
(1967). It is an interesting question whether a court could consider the/acts underlying an
uncounseled conviction in sentencing under the new Code.
155 See note 112 & accompanying text supra. See S. REP. No. 96-553 at 912.
156 Two creations of prior sentencing law boosted the acceptability of considering past
criminal history in a rehabilitative context: indeterminate sentences and a parole commission
to monitor them. Together these two creations comprised the "medical model." Under the
prior law, a court might use a defendant's past criminal history to decide whether the defend-
ant was in need of rehabilitative treatment and, if so, whether it should be administered in a
prison or nonprison setting. See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 20. More specifically, the
court might imprison the defendant needing treatment because, based on the defendant's
prior criminal history, it anticipated that he would commit further crime, and thus violate his
conditions of release if placed on probation. Under the medical model, however, this defend-
ant would be "treated" and released from prison as soon as the parole commission found him
"cured," or rehabilitated. The parole commission's careful surveillance theoretically miti-
gated the harmful effect of any error in the predictive criteria used by the court in fashioning
the sentence. See note 234 & accompanying text infra.
At least as a simple matter of fairness, use of prior criminal history in this context seems
less objectionable than its use under S. 1722. The bill does away with the medical model,
with its rehabilitative purpose, and imposes instead determinate sentencing for the purpose of
incapacitation or punishment beyond that required for simple commission of the crime.
Since the parole commission will no longer be on hand to monitor the defendant's progress
toward rehabilitation and to correct any errors in sentencing, it is arguable that the informa-
tion relied on by the judge in incarcerating the defendant must be far more reliable than it
was under the old system of rehabilitation. More specifically, it may be argued that hearsay,
which was previously admitted into evidence to show the need for correctional treatment,
should not be admissible to show the need for incapacitation for a fixed term that may endure
beyond that necessary for the defendant's rehabilitation.
157 See notes 106-08 & accompanying text supra.
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ardy.158 The precedent neither illuminates nor answers these problems,
but they come sharply into focus under the sentencing procedure or-
dained by the Code.
The court finally determines that, depending on the record devel-
oped at the sentencing hearing and the findings and conclusions the
court draws from the evidence, it may be unnecessary to rule on any of
the constitutional questions presented. Accordingly, the court decides to
defer any decision on these questions until the sentencing hearing, and
turns to the statutory interpretation issues and defendants' objections to
the Sentencing Commission's guidelines and policy statements.
The judge first addresses the contention that the rules controlling
the use of incapacitation and rehabilitation as sentencing objectives are
irreconcilable and thereby unenforceable. 159 He acknowledges that a
sentence to protect the public from the defendant's future crime may be
indistinguishable from a sentence to rehabilitate the defendant: both
purposes theoretically require the defendant's, detention until he is able
to lead a law-abiding life. The judge notes, however, that the maximum
prison sentences provided by the Code, or by the Commission under its
guidelines, are seldom lengthy enough to accomplish a defendant's com-
plete rehabilitation. The court observes that over forty percent of con-
victed federal defendants are twenty-nine years old or under. 160 These
individuals, when truly dedicated to a life of crime, often may be dan-
gerous to society until they are past middle age. Since prison sentences
designed for incapacitation are generally not that long, sentencing for
incapacitation apparently does not, under the Code, also serve the pur-
pose of rehabilitation. Rather, incapacitation is a means of sparing soci-
ety from the defendant's crimes for a limited and arbitrary period of
time. The two sentencing purposes are separate and distinct, mutually
exclusive, and therefore reconcilable.
The court next addresses the question whether use of the various
section 994(d) defendant criteria violates the Code's requirement of ra-
cial, sexual, and socioeconomic neutrality.161 The court concludes that
an obvious correlation between a person's socioeconomic status and his
education, vocational skills, and previous employment record, for exam-
ple, does not permit the conclusion that as a matter of law every use of
the criteria by the Commission or the courts violates the neutral guide-
lines requirement. The court acknowledges, however, that the guide-
lines in the context of a particular case might lack the requisite
158 See notes 118-25 & accompanying text supra.
159 Se notes 126-29 & accompanying text supra.
160 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS FOR 1979 (forthcoming).
161 See notes 130-31 & accompanying text supra.
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neutrality; therefore, the defendants can renew the objection at the sen-
tencing hearing.
The court also reserves ruling on Disadvantaged's challenge to the
empirical evidence underlying the Commission's conclusion that he or
members of his category of defendant will commit further crime if
placed on probation. Here, too, the disposition of the case may render a
decision unnecessary.
The court considers whether Congress intended extrinsic criminal
acts not probative of the present charge to be used in imposing punish-
ment beyond that required for commission of the crime. 162 The court
disagrees with the defendants' interpretation of the statute and finds
that Congress intended prior criminal history and degree of dependence
on criminal conduct for a livelihood to be considered for the purpose of
punishment whenever the Sentencing Commission deems this informa-
tion relevant.
Finally, the court dismisses the defendants' contention that the
guideline ranges prescribing imprisonment impermissibly include con-
siderations of rehabilitation because they are based on sentences im-
posed under prior law.163 Any influence the purpose of rehabilitation
might have had on prior average sentences is too remote to the new
guidelines to invalidate them.
3. The Hearing
In the first part of the sentencing hearing, involving the category of
offense, the court considers the cases of both defendants together to facil-
itate development of the evidence.164 The judge receives all the offense-
related evidence, including the transcript of the trial, and hears argu-
ment of counsel concerning the applicable category of offense. He rules
162 See notes 135-40 & accompanying text supra.
163 See notes 141-42 & accompanying text supra.
164 Had the court decided to convene separate sentencing hearings for Advantaged and
Disadvantaged, the defendant whose case was heard second undoubtedly would object. He
would claim that he was denied a fair hearing before an impartial judge because the judge
had already determined his offense severity rating in arriving at the sentence to be imposed
for the first defendant. The judge, having already considered the same facts and issues in the
earlier hearing and having made a determination, would allegedly turn deaf ears on argu-
ments in the second case that a different category of offense should apply. The second de-
fendant would claim that the judge came to his hearing with the decision already made.
If the judge did deviate in the second case, whichever defendant received the harshest
disposition might claim a denial of equal protection: the judge unreasonably applied the law
in a different fashion to an offense committed under identical circumstances, with the differ-
ent application perhaps resulting in a deprivation of liberty.
In either case, the second defendant could claim that the judge should have disqualified
himself from presiding over the second hearing to "avoid the appearance of impropriety."
ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2.
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that the "very high severity" category of offense applies 65 and then,
bifurcating the hearing for consideration of the applicable categories of
defendants and the imposition of sentence, he proceeds initially with
Advantaged's case.
The prosecutor introduces Advantaged's presentence investigation
report into evidence and rests. The defendant thus has the burden of
going forward with evidence to refute the report.166 Advantaged does
not challenge the probation officer's conclusion that he is within the cat-
egory of defendants who are good candidates for a sentence of proba-
tion. In fact, he buttresses that conclusion by presenting the testimony
of his parents and close friends. They represent that he will have strong
family support and the backing of several in the community if placed on
probation. Advantaged exercises his right of allocution and makes a
strong plea for leniency. The government offers no rebutting evidence,
and counsel begin their arguments over the proper sentence.
The category of offense clearly requires a sentence to prison for
forty to fifty months, regardless of the defendant category. The prosecu-
tor urges the court to sentence Advantaged to fifty months, the maxi-
mum prison term allowed. Defense counsel, on the other hand, urges
the court to step outside the guidelines and sentence Advantaged to pro-
bation or, alternatively, to a lesser prison term than that specified in the
guidelines. Defense counsel argues that leniency is appropriate in this
case because title III, section 994(i) states that imprisonment is not ap-
propriate for a first offense unless that offense is "a crime of violence or
an otherwise serious offense."' 6 7 Advantaged contends that the charged
offense is not "serious."
The court responds that section 1812 drug smuggling, under the
circumstances presented in this case, is a serious offense and that section
994(i) is therefore inapposite. The judge then reminds counsel that he
must impose a sentence within the guidelines unless he finds an aggra-
165 In categorizing drug trafficking, the Sentencing Commission reviewed considerable em-
pirical evidence and statistical analyses and consulted experts on the points of inquiry man-
dated by the seven offense criteria of title III, § 994(c). For example, the Commission
conducted surveys to measure the community view of the gravity of drug trafficking on the
national, state and local level. See S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(c)(4). It also con-
ducted surveys of the "public concern generated by the offense." Id § 994(c)(5). Experts
testified about deterrence, see id § 994(c)(6); statistics, amplified by expert opinion, showed
the incidence of the offense. See id § 994(c)(7).
Neither Advaniaged nor Disadvantaged challenge the Commission's findings based on
this evidence or the relative weight the Commission assigned to each criterion in arriving at a
severity level. The Court would allow such a challenge, whether centered only on the Com-
mission's evidence or on that evidence in light of additional evidence subsequently produced
by the defendant.
166 See note 94 & accompanying text supra.
167 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994().
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vating or mitigating circumstance "that was not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guide-
lines."1 68 He inquires whether Advantaged has any evidence of mitigat-
ing circumstances that the Commission did not consider. Counsel
responds that he has no such evidence to offer.
169
At the conclusion of Advantaged's hearing, the court summarizes
the situation: Advantaged's offense category is "very high," and it re-
quires imprisonment for the purposes of punishment and deterrence.
His defendant category calls for a sentence of probation with moderate
supervision for the purpose of rehabilitation. The guidelines
subordinate the need for rehabiliation to the need for punishment and
deterrence, and therefore Advantaged must be sentenced to prison. For
lack of any foundation in the record, the court rejects the defendant's
prayer for a sentence below the guidelines and imposes the maximum
sentence allowed-fifty months. Complying with the requirement that
he state his reasons for imposing a particular sentence, 170 the judge
states that he selected fifty months because he anticipates having to sen-
tence Disadvantaged to an even longer prison term. Since the defend-
ants are equally culpable, their sentences should be as nearly equal as
possible.1 7 1 The judge overrules Advantaged's objection that it is im-
proper to be influenced by one defendant's sentence in fashioning the
sentence of another.
172
The court also finds that since Advantaged's sentence is based only
on the category of offense requirement, and does not involve the pur-
poses of incapacitation or punishment beyond that required for simple
commission of the crime, it is unnecessary to rule on Advantaged's
168 Id tit. I, § 2003(b).
169 Implicit in § 2003(b) is the notion that the Commission must issue a comprehensive
statement with each guideline, explaining what it considered in designing the offense and
defendant categories making up the guideline. Without such a statement, or to the extent the
statement is inadequate or ambiguous, the district court would have too much discretion to
fashion sentences outside the guidelines. The absence of a statement would thus defeat the
goal of strict guideline sentencing and lead to more direct appeals. Moreover, parties might
have to subpoena commissioners to testify about what they did or did not consider in formu-
lating the guidelines. The need for such testimony would increase or decrease depending on
the adequacy of the Commission's initial explanation.
170 "The court at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposi-
tion of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence is not of the kind, or is outside the range
described in [the applicable guidelines], the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence
different from that described." S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 2003(c).
171 One of the goals the judge must consider in imposing a sentence is the need to avoid
unwarranted disparity among the sentences of similarly situated defendants. Id § 2003(a) (6).
172 To avoid disparate sentencing, courts historically have considered sentences imposed in
cases other than the one at bench. See Frankel, supra note 5. A sentence in one case will be
relevant in another case only if the purposes of sentencing are the same in both cases and the
circumstances of the offense and the nature of the defendant, to the extent relevant to the
sentencing purposes, are also the same.
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guideline, statutory, and constitutional objections. 173
The court then turns to Disadvantaged's case. Disadvantaged im-
mediately objects that the judge, by justifying his high sentence for Ad-
vantaged on the grounds that it would be more nearly equal to
Disadvantaged's sentence, has illustrated his predetermination of Disad-
vantaged's sentence and thus denied him a fair hearing. The judge
overrules the objection and proceeds to hear the evidence. The prosecu-
tor again introduces the presentence investigation report into evidence
and rests, and Disadvantaged must assume the burden of going forward
with the evidence.
Disadvantaged does not rebut the probation officer's representa-
tions about his upbringing in Miami's inner city, his lack of formal
schooling beyond the ninth grade, and his previous conviction for pos-
session of marijuana. Disadvantaged does challenge, however, the of-
ficer's conclusion, based in part on the Sentencing Commission
guidelines and policy statements, that he is a poor risk for probation and
that he needs incapacitation. According to Disadvantaged, the guide-
lines would not indicate a need for incapacitation but for the finding
that he obtains much of his livelihood from criminal conduct. This find-
ing, he argues, is inappropriate.174 For the same reasons he protests the
probation officer's suggestion that he might meet the requirements of
title III, section 994(h) (2), which mandates a substantial term of impris-
onment for defendants who commit their offenses as part of a pattern of
criminal conduct from which they derive a substantial portion of their
income. Disadvantaged objects because the finding of dependency on
criminal conduct for a livelihood is based on the introduction, through
the presentence investigation report, of hearsay evidence.175 Through
use of this evidence, he claims, he will be imprisoned for conduct never
reduced to a conviction and without the usual due process protections
that attend a conviction.' 76 Overruling this objection, the court states
that the evidence might not be used for the purposes of incapacitation or
punishment, but might, instead, be used only for the purpose of rehabili-
tation. ' 77 Use of the information for this latter purpose, it concludes, is
an acceptable practice.' 7
8
Disadvantaged then proceeds to produce positive evidence to refute
173 The judge finds that Advantaged lacks standing to challenge the sentencing provisions
since the provisions do not affect him adversely.
174 See S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, 994(d). See notes 102-15 & accompanying text supra.
175 See note 110 & accompanying text supra.
176 See notes 106-15 & accompanying text suira.
177 Disadvantaged argues that the use of hearsay evidence of prior criminal conduct is
unconstitutional even for the purpose of rehabilitation, but concedes Supreme Court prece-
dent allowing it. See note 112 supra.
178 See note 112 & accompanying text supra.
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the probation officer's conclusion that he should be incapacitated. He
calls two relatives to the stand to testify. They indicate that they are
well settled family men, residents of a middle class neighborhood in
Miami, and steadily employed as skilled workers in the construction in-
dustry. Both are willing to take Disadvantaged into their homes. They
claim that they can find work for Disadvantaged as an apprentice car-
penter and are confident that he can lead a law-abiding life if placed on
probation.
Disadvantaged also calls the Chairman of the Sentencing Commis-
sion to testify. The questioning centers on how the Commission con-
cluded that persons of Disadvantaged's background will commit more
crime unless removed from society. The Chairman states that the Com-
mission based its conclusion on empirical evidence gathered from vari-
ous state and federal authorities engaged in parole decisionmaking. He
explains that in formulating devices to single out those offenders who
are likely to become recidivists, these parole authorities use a variety of
offender characteristics, such as education, vocational skills, unemploy-
ment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties. The
Commission used these five characteristics, along with the others listed
in title III, section 994(d), to decide whether a particular class of defend-
ants should be sentenced to probation for rehabilitative purposes. The
Chairman insists, however, that the Commission heeded the prohibition
of section 994(e) against considering the five quoted offender character-
istics in determining whether to imprison a defendant.17 9 These charac-
teristics, he says, were not part of the predictive device that the
Commission used to select those offenders who must be incapacitated for
society's protection. The predictive device employed for that purpose
mainly used offender age and criminal history. 180 The chairman de-
clines to venture an opinion about the predictive device's accuracy,
other than that the Commission held the device to be reliable.
With the conclusion of the Chairman's testimony, the presentation
of evidence ends and the arguments of counsel commence. Counsel for
Disadvantaged begins and renews the various constitutional objections
he made in his prehearing motion. 181 He also renews his objection to
the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the Commission's decision
that offenders such as he will commit more crime and thereby pose an
179 See notes 65-68 & accompanying text supra.
180 The Chairman acknowledges, as he must, that the predictive device mandating the
disposition recommended for Disadvantaged has never been challenged in a judicial proceed-
ing. This proceeding is, after all, the first sentencing under the new Code. He also acknowl-
edges that the reliability of the state ahd federal parole commission predictive devices
considered by the Sentencing Commission has not been ascertained in an adversarial judicial
proceeding.
181 See notes 95-125 & accompanying text supra.
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unacceptable threat to society, unless they are incapacitated. 182 To im-
prison such persons on the evidence presented to the Commission is not
to remove them from society for society's protection, counsel submits,
but to punish them arbitrarily on account of their personal characteris-
tics and, thus, to deny them due process and the equal protection of the
laws.' 8 3 Next, counsel reasserts his argument that the guidelines appli-
cable to Disadvantaged violate the section 994(d) requirement of neu-
trality because of the correlation between the section 994(d) defendant
criteria and race, sex, and socioeconomic status. 184 According to coun-
sel, minorities and individuals of low socioeconomic status are more
likely to receive a prison sentence, as opposed to probation, than whites
of middle or high socioeconomic status.
Finally, counsel for Disadvantaged adds a new objection to his col-
lection: all guidelines calling for incapacitation are invalid because the
Commission violated section 994(e) in formulating them. According to
counsel, the decision that a particular type of defendant needs incapaci-
tation must be based on a threshold determination that the defendant is
not amenable to rehabilitation on probation. 8 5 This threshold decision
must be made through use of all eleven of the title III, section 994(d)
defendant criteria.18 6 Therefore, the Commission must have considered,
at least indirectly, the five defendant criteria that section 994(e) says
may not be considered in deciding whether to incapacitate a defend-
ant. 1
87
After hearing the government's argument in rebuttal, the court ar-
ticulates its findings and conclusions from the bench. It finds first, con-
trary to the probation officer's recommendation, that Disadvantaged
should not be categorized as one who will commit more crime. Accord-
ing to the court, Disadvantaged is among those defendants considered
an acceptable risk for a sentence of probation. 88 Likewise, the court
182 See notes 132-34 & accompanying text supra.
183 See note 134 & accompanying text supra.
184 See notes 130-31 & accompanying text supra.
185 See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra. The Commission must make this threshold
decision because the Code requires it to consider rehabilitation in sentencing. S. 1722, supra
note 12, tit. III, § 9 94(g). See S. REP. No. 96-553 at 934-35.
186 See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
187 Among the eleven criteria are education, vocational skills, employment record, family
ties and responsibilities, and community ties. S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(d).
188 As required by the Code, see notes 53, 90 & accompanying text supra, the court catego-
rizing the defendant in the case at hand makes findings on the need for rehabilitation, inca-
pacitation, and increased punishment beyond that required for simple commission of the
crime. In considering the need for rehabilitation, the Commission's policy statements direct
the court to the eleven criteria of section 994(d), each of which calls for a factual determina-
tion.
The court accordingly makes findings corresponding to the eleven criteria. (1) The par-
ties have stipulated that Disadvantaged is 21 years old. (2) The court finds that Disadvan-
1981]
GERALD BARD TJOFLA T [Vol. 72
does not believe that under section 994(h) (2), Disadvantaged must be
sentenced to a substantial term of imprisonment. Since, however, the
category of offense in this case is "very high" and the guidelines man-
date a prison sentence regardless of the applicable defendant category,
Disadvantaged, like Advantaged, is not entitled to probation.
Since the defendant category applicable to Disadvantaged does not
call for incapacitation, or imprisonment for enhanced punishment, the
court finds that Disadvantaged lacks standing to object to the sufficiency
of the evidence underpinning the Sentencing Commission's method for
predicting future criminal conduct. Disadvantaged likewise lacks stand-
ing to object to the lack of neutrality of the section 994(d) offender crite-
ria. Further, the court, as in Advantaged's case, finds it unnecessary to
reach the constitutional questions.
The court concludes by reiterating its earlier findings, in Ad-
vantaged's case, on the offense severity and the need for imprisonment
for punishment and deterrence. It sentences Disadvantaged to the
guidelines' maximum, fifty months imprisonment, which is the same
sentence given Advantaged.
taged has a ninth-grade education, and (3) that, although he lacks vocational skills, he will
gain carpenter's skills if placed on probation. (4) Since there is no evidence that Disadvan-
taged suffers from mental or emotional incapacity, the court makes no finding on this crite-
rion. (5) The court infers from Disadvantaged's history of drug dealing that he uses
marijuana but is not drug dependent. Disadvantaged has not denied prior use of marijuana.
(6) The court finds that Disadvantaged has no employment experience, except in drug traf-
ficking, but that he is employable as a carpenter's apprentice. (7) The court believes the
testimony of Disadvantaged's relatives and finds that although he has no ties or responsibili-
ties to his immediate family, Disadvantaged nevertheless has ties with the relatives who testi-
fied on his behalf. (8) The court finds no ties with the Miami community, however, except
with individuals dealing in drugs. (9) The court observes that although Disadvantaged's role
in the offense was considered in assessing offense severity, it can also be considered in assessing
the need for rehabilitation. Disadvantaged's role was significant and substantial, which indi-
cates a need for correction. (10) Since Disadvantaged has not rebutted the statement in the
presentence investigation report that he was convicted in state court for possession of mari-
juana, the court accepts it as true. (11) The court finds that Disadvantaged has been support-
ing himself by trafficking drugs.
From these facts the court finds a clear need for rehabilitation. It bases this conclusion
mainly on defendant's age, his limited education and employment skills and his tendency to
resort to crime for survival. Because of the informal, but close, around-the-clock supervision
Disadvantaged would receive while living with his relatives and working as an apprentice
carpenter, the court believes it likely that he can complete a term of probation without violat-
ing the law. The court stresses that maximum supervision by the probation officer would be
required, along with tightly drawn, restrictive conditions of probation.
With regard to incapacitation, the court finds that since Disadvantaged is an acceptable
risk for probation, he probably will not commit more crime and therefore does not need to be
incapacitated.
Finally, the court finds that under the guidelines, Disadvantaged's past criminal history
is not so severe that he should be punished more than is required for simple commission of the
crime.
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D. REVIEW OF THE SENTENCE
Both Advantaged and Disadvantaged appeal their convictions,
claiming that the district court committed reversible error in denying
their motion to suppress the evidence seized at the time of their arrests.
The Code preserves a defendant's right to challenge the validity of his
conviction on direct appeal, 18 9 and it also grants a defendant the right
to appeal his sentence if it is greater than the maximum sentence pre-
scribed by the guidelines the district court finds applicable.190 The gov-
ernment has a reciprocal right to appeal if the sentence is below the
guideline minimum. 191 Since the sentence given each defendant in this
case is within the Commission guidelines that the court found applica-
ble, neither defendants nor the government possesses a right to direct
appellate review. 1
92
189 As to a direct appeal by a defendant, S. 1722 provides: "(a) Appeal in General.-
Except as provided in subsection (b), a defendant may appeal to a United States court of
appeals from a final decision, judgment, or order entered by a district court of the United
States in a criminal case." S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 3723(a).
190 As to a defendant's appeal of his sentence, S. 1722 provides:
(a) Appeal by a Defendant.-A defendant may file a notice of appeal in the dis-
trict court for review of an otherwise final sentence imposed for a felony or a Class A
misdemeanor if the sentence includes a greater fine or term of imprisonment or term of
supervised release than the maximum established in the guidelines, or includes a more
limiting condition of probation or supervised release under section 2103(b)(6) or (b)(1 1)
than the maximum established in the guidelines, that are issued by the Sentencing Com-
mission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1), and that are found by the sentencing court to
be applicable to the case, unless-
(1) the sentence is equal to or less than the sentence recommended or not op-
posed by the attorney for the government pursuant to a plea agreement under Rule
I l(e)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; or
(2) the sentence is that provided in an accepted plea agreement pursuant to
Rule 1 l(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Id § 3725(a).
191 As to an appeal of a sentence by the government, S. 1722 provides:
(b) Appeal by the Government.-The government may, with the approval of the
Attorney General or his designee, file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of
an otherwise final sentence imposed for a felony or a Class A misdemeanor if the sentence
includes a lesser fine or term of imprisonment or term of supervised release than the
minimum established in the guidelines, or includes a less limiting condition of probation
or supervised release under section 2103(b)(6) or (b)(l 1) than the minimum established
in the guidelines, that are issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
994(a)(1), and that are found by the sentencing court to be applicable to the case, un-
less-
(1) the sentence is equal to or greater than the sentence recommended or not
opposed by the attorney for the government pursuant to a plea agreement under Rule
1 l(e)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures; or
(2) the sentence is that provided in an accepted plea agreement pursuant to
Rule II (e) (1) (C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Id § 3725(b).
192 A direct appeal under §§ 3725(a)-(b) assumes that the lower court applied the guide-
lines properly. The only question is whether it was appropriate for the court to impose a
sentence outside those guidelines. The parties must seek remedy for alleged error in the
court's selection of guidelines, whether it relates to the court's fact findings or its application
of the guidelines to the facts, in rule 35(b)(2) proceedings before the lower court. Id tit. II,
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The defendants remain convinced, however, that the constitutional,
statutory, and guidelines deficiencies they alleged in their presentence
hearing motions are of sufficient magnitude to render the Code's sen-
tencing scheme unenforceable and their sentences a nullity. At the same
time, the government stands convinced that the district court erred in
finding inapplicable the category of defendant recommended for Disad-
vantaged in his presentence investigation report. According to the gov-
ernment, Disadvantaged belongs to a category of defendant requiring
imprisonment for sixty to seventy-five months for the public's safety.
The defendants act first. While prosecuting their direct appeals in
the court of appeals, they move the district court to set aside their
sentences on the ground that the sentences are illegal or that they were
imposed in an illegal manner. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
35(a) provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time." Although the defendants have been admitted to bail pending
resolution of their direct appeals and could defer such a rule 35(a) mo-
tion indefinitely, they are not confident that the reviewing court will
reverse their convictions. They do not want to risk being taken into
custody in the event their convictions are affirmed before the attacks on
their sentences have run their course.1 93 Accordingly, the defendants
§ 11 (t). After the lower court rules on the rule 35(b)(2) motion, a dissatisfied party can
petition for leave to appeal the lower court's determination. Id tit. I, §§ 3723(b), 3724(d). If
error in guideline application were reviewable on direct appeal, rule 35(b)(2) would be use-
less.
Claims that a sentence is illegal or imposed in an illegal manner also arise under rule 35,
rather than under the direct appeal provisions. The Senate bill does not change substantively
the existing provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), which provides for dis-
trict court review of such claims before an appeal may be taken. But see note 274 & accompa-
nying text infra. The text of the pertinent rule 35 sections, as amended by S. 1722, is as
follows:
(a) Correction of an Illegal Sentence.-The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time.
(b) Correction of an Illegally or Erroneously Imposed Sentence.-The court, on
motion of either party or on its own motion, may correct-
(1) a sentence imposed in an illegal manner;
(2) a sentence imposed as a result of incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a) . ...
S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. II, § 111(t).
The ultimate standard of review on direct appeal is whether the sentence imposed
outside the guidelines is "unreasonable." Id tit. I, § 3725(d). Practically speaking, it must be
assumed that the court of appeals would first consider whether the lower court's finding of an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance unforeseen by the Sentencing Commission in formu-
lating the guidelines, id., § 2003(b), is "clearly erroneous." Then if the lower court's fact
finding withstood scrutiny, the court of appeals would consider whether the sentence the
lower court fashioned to accommodate the unforeseen circumstance is "unreasonable." It can
only be assumed that the "clearly erroneous" standard would apply to review of the lower
court's fact finding, for S. 1722 does not specify the standard.
t93 Defendants are not certain that they will remain free once their appeals on the merits
have been resolved against them. Although the new Code indicates that a court may grant
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proceed with the rule 35(a) motions without delay, advancing all the
arguments made in their presentence motions. 194 Simultaneously, they
file a motion under rule 35(b) (1), claiming that their sentences were im-
posed in an illegal manner, and a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1976), the habeas corpus provision for federal prisoners, attacking their
sentences on the grounds that they were imposed "in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States."195
The government, meanwhile, files a rule 35(b)(2) motion with the
district court claiming error in its selection of Disadvantaged's defend-
ant category and thus in its application of the Sentencing Commission's
guidelines. Rule 35(b)(2), as amended by the Code, provides that "[t]he
[district] court, on motion of either party or on its own motion, may
correct. . . a sentence imposed as a result of incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines. . . within 120 days after sentence is imposed.'
96
The government files its motion well within the 120-day time period
19 7
bail pending appeal of the conviction or of a sentence outside the guidelines, S. 1722, supra
note 12, tit. I, § 3504, it is not clear whether the court may grant bail pending resolution of a
petition for leave to appeal or an appeal of a rule 35 ruling. Id. See S. REP. No. 96-553 at
1082-84. Although the Code and the legislative history are vague concerning this issue, cases
under prior law provide some encouragement to defendants. See, e.g. , Binion" v. United States,
352 U.S. 1028 (1957); Davis v. United States, 243 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1957); United States v.
Thompson, 152 F. Supp. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
194 Advantaged adds another ground to his rule 35(a) motion attacking his sentence as
illegal. He alludes to the court's statement of reasons for his sentence of 50 months, see text
accompanying note 171 supra. The court stated that it had imposed this sentence, which was
the maximum within the guideline range, because it anticipated giving Disadvantaged a
greater sentence. Advantaged believes that at the time, the court anticipated placing Disad-
vantaged in the category of defendant recommended by the presentence investigation report.
This category called for incapacitation and a sentence of 60 to 75 months. As it turned out,
the court chose a different category of defendant for Disadvantaged, which lead to a sentence
of 50 months. Advantaged renews his earlier objection to being sentenced "extra" on account
of Disadvantaged's offender characteristics and adds that there now is no basis for requiring
him to serve 50, as opposed to 40, months. The sentence was based on an erroneous percep-
tion of the facts and thus should be set aside.
When Advantaged makes his motion, Disadvantaged moves the court to set aside his
sentence of 50 months, as well. He argues that the court was influenced in setting Ad-
vantaged's sentence by the defendant category recomended for Disadvantaged. Since the
court did not adopt this defendant category for Disadvantaged, Advantaged's sentence is
improper. Since Advantaged's sentence is improper, Disadvantaged's sentence, which the
court meant to be equal to Advantaged's because the two were equally culpable, is also incor-
rect.
195 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). A defendant can also make a § 2255 motion attacking a sen-
tence on the grounds that it is "in excess of the maximum authorized by law." It is possible
that this section would permit a claim that the court applied the wrong guidelines or improp-
erly set a sentence above the guidelines.
Defendants invoke all of these possibilities as a matter of precaution. If the court should
reject one or several of them, review may still be obtained through another.
196 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. II, § 111(t).
197 The Code's amendments to rule 35 do not resolve a controversy that has arisen under
the current rule. Both the current rule and the amended rule provide that under certain
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and requests the court to impose the guidelines recommended in Disad-
vantaged's presentence investigation report and to resentence the de-
fendant accordingly. 198  The government requests an evidentiary
hearing in order to show, first, that the court was incorrect in catego-
rizing Disadvantaged as an acceptable probation risk, and, second, that
the Sentencing Commission's predictive device indicates that Disadvan-
taged should be incapacitated.
Disadvantaged objects to an evidentiary hearing for these purposes
on the grounds that the government had ample opportunity to develop
these points at the sentencing hearing. According to Disadvantaged, the
policy reasons that undergird the doctrines of res judicata and law-of-
the-case should preclude relitigation of the issues. Neither party has any
excuse for failing to produce at the sentencing hearing all the relevant
evidence it has, especially in a case such as this, in which the issues are
clear. Disadvantaged argues that it is manifestly unfair to allow a party
who fails to produce all its evidence at the sentencing hearing a second
chance to do so in a rule 35(b) (2) context.
According to Disadvantaged, the court should only consider on a
rule 35(b)(2) motion whether the existing evidence is sufficient to sup-
port the court's fact-finding and subsequent selection of guidelines. If
the evidence is insufficient, the court must decide what facts are deter-
minable from the record and what guidelines apply under those find-
ings. Although it may be necessary to make additional findings,
depending on how extensive the court's fact findings were at sentencing,
the court should make these findings on the existing record. It is unnec-
essary and inappropriate, Disadvantaged argues, to begin taking new
evidence at this point.
The government responds that the sentencing process under the
Code does not end with the imposition of sentence and, thus, that res
circumstances a court may correct a sentence "within 120 days after the sentence is imposed."
FED. R. GRIM. P. 35(b); S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. II, § I 1I(t)(b). A problem arises when the
parties file a proper rule 35 motion before the 120-day deadline, but the court is unable to
rule on their motion until after 120 days have passed. Can the court still correct the sentence?
Several circuit courts of appeal have ruled that in such situations the court may go ahead and
decide the motion within a reasonable time after the deadline expires. United States v. Men-
doza, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); United States v. Stallings, 516 F.2d 1287 (4th Cir.
1975); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 962 (1975); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 420 U.S. 948
(1975); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 896 n.73 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1120 (1975); Leyvas v. United States, 371 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1967); Dodge v. Bennett, 335
F.2d 657 (lst Cir. 1964).
198 The government would like the court to decide its rule 35(b)(2) motion as quickly as
possible because, if it loses, it would like to petition the higher court for leave to appeal, S.
1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 3724(d), and to argue its case while the defendant's appeal on the
merits is still pending. The two appeals might then be consolidated. It is not clear, however,
that this could occur in this case. See note 228 infra.
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judicata and law-of-the-case policies are inapplicable. According to the
government, the sentencing process embraces not only the sentencing
itself, but also: direct appellate review of sentences outside the guide-
lines; rule 35(b)(2) proceedings to reconsider the selection of guidelines,
and subsequent appellate review; and motions under rule 35(a) and
35(b) (1) to set aside illegal sentences or sentences imposed in an illegal
manner and subsequent appellate review. Rule 35(b) (2) proceedings, in
particular, accommodate the introduction of further evidence, especially
when the court holds different guidelines to apply and the defendant
must be resentenced. At resentencing the defendant may exercise the
right of allocution. The government should have an opportunity to
counterbalance the defendant's remarks with evidence of its own. Fur-
ther, the government contends, closing the evidence once the parties rest
at the sentencing hearing would be unfair and could lead to injustice in
a case in which the court fashioned the defendant's sentence from guide-
lines not anticipated at the sentencing hearing. In such cases, the parties
might not have anticipated the sort of evidence that eventually dictated
the sentence imposed.
The district court agrees with Disadvantaged and denies the gov-
ernment's request for an evidentiary hearing in the rule 35(b)(2) pro-
ceeding. The court notes that the government had every reason to know
at the time of the original sentencing hearing that the evidence now in
question would be relevant; it relates to the guideline recommended in
the presentence investigation report. Further, the government has not
indicated that the proffered evidence could not have been known at the
time of the sentencing hearing. Under the circumstances, it would be
unfair, the court reasons, to allow the government a second chance to
prove the same points.199
The government immediately petitions the court of appeals for a
writ of mandamus on the grounds that the district court abused its dis-
cretion in refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing in the rule 35(b)(2)
proceeding. 200 The court of appeals denies the government's motion be-
199 This ruling conforms with the reigning proposition prior to passage of the Code that
inquiries under rule 35 must be limited to the existing record. See, e.g., Semet v. United
States, 422 F.2d 1269, 1271 (10th Cir. 1970); Gilinsky v. United States, 335 F.2d 914, 916-17
(9th Cir. 1964); 2 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 582
(1969).
200 The government petitions for mandamus for three reasons: First, it is questionable
whether the district court's decision not to consider the evidence can be reviewed in appellate
proceedings instituted under title I, § 3724(d). The government points out that neither
§ 3724(d) nor any other provision of the Code specifies when a court of appeals may grant a
petition for leave to appeal. Second, even if the district court's ruling on the acceptance of
evidence is reviewable under § 3724(d), there is no guarantee that this review will occur. The
court of appeats may decline, in the exercise of its discretion, to grant the petition. Third,
there is no authority delineating the appropriate standard of review applicable to a district
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cause it believes the government can obtain review through other
means. If the government loses the rule 35(b)(2) motion, it can petition
for leave to appeal. If its argument is strong enough, the court of ap-
peals will grant review. If the government wins the motion, it will not
need appellate review. If the defendant obtains review of the 35(b)(2)
ruling, the government can cross-appeal the question of receiving addi-
tional evidence.
I. The Rule 35(a), (b) (1), and (b) (2) and Section 2255 Motions
In order to preserve on appeal its right to question the district
court's decision not to allow introduction of additional evidence, the
government proffers, at the beginning of the hearing, the evidence it had
sought to have admitted. Disadvantaged renews his objections to hear-
say evidence concerning his criminal background.20 ' The court over-
rules his objection and allows the government to proceed with its
proffer.
The goverment first augments the history of Disadvantaged's crimi-
nal activity developed at the sentencing hearing in order to demonstrate
that Disadvantaged is not amenable to corrective treatment on proba-
tion and that he must be incapacitated for the public's protection. The
government calls several witnesses, including law enforcement officers,
who are familiar with the circumstances of Disadvantaged's earlier state
court conviction for possegsion of marijuana. Their testimony, consist-
ing mostly of hearsay, indicates that Disadvantaged was a drug pusher
of no small magnitude at the time he committed the possession offense.
They testify that Disadvantaged had direct connections with marijuana
smugglers. The state charged Disadvantaged only with possession, the
best case it could make out at the time. This newly presented evidence,
court's disposition of a rule 35(b)(2) motion once the petition for leave to appeal has been
granted. Title I, § 3722, empowers the Supreme Court to "prescribe rules of pleadings, prac-
tice, and procedure with respect to appeals from decisions, judgments, and orders entered in
criminal cases in the district courts" S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 3722(a). It is not clear,
however, whether this grant encompasses the power to make rules dictating when a petition
for leave to appeal may or must be granted, what claims may or must be considered when a
petition is granted, or the standard of review that an appellate court must employ.
By petitioning for mandamus, the government hopes to avoid these problems. Accord-
ing to the government, the petition must be granted if, as here, the district court clearly
abused its discretion and, as here, there may be no other means to obtain appellate review.
See Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976); Arthur Young & Company
v. United States District Court, 549 F.2d 686, 691-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977); Holms v. United States Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 1243, 1247 (7th Cir. 1976).
The government suggests that it might also be entitled to a writ of mandamus when a
district court makes a clearly erroneous decision at a sentencing hearing that cannot be re-
viewed on direct appeal because the sentence imposed falls within the guidelines. There is no
assurance that review of such sentences will be obtainable under title I, § 3724(d).
201 See notes 106-15 & accompanying text supra.
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when considered with the other evidence brought out in the sentencing
hearing, indicates that, for at least the last three years, Disadvantaged
has made his living unlawfully in the narcotics trade.
The government also produces the testimony of persons who helped
formulate the Commission's guidelines, as well as that of several experts
involved in devising predictive devices for state parole commissions.
These individuals testify that the predictive device the Commission used
in creating categories of defendants is founded on strong empirical evi-
dence. Furthermore, in their opinion Disadvantaged's age and history
of criminal activity, as portrayed by the record now before the court,
indicate that Disadvantaged will commit further crime, even if given
maximum supervision on probation.
At the conclusion of the government's proffer,20 2 the court again
states that it will not consider this additional evidence in deciding
whether it applied the proper guidelines to Disadvantaged. It then en-
tertains argument of counsel over whether the evidence on the record
made at the sentencing hearing is sufficient to support the factual find-
ings necessary to make the court's chosen guidelines applicable. The
court, after careful consideration, rules that its earlier factual findings
are not sufficiently supported by the evidence after all: on reexamina-
tion, the facts indicate the need to incapacitate Disadvantaged. There-
fore, the court should apply the defendant category recommended in
Disadvantaged's presentence investigation report. According to the
guidelines, this defendant category requires imprisonment for sixty to
seventy-five months. After affording Disadvantaged the right of allocu-
tion, and allowing counsel to argue about the appropriate sentence
within that range, the court resentences Disadvantaged. Because it is a
close question whether Disadvantaged really needs to be incapacitated,
the court decides upon sixty months. Further, the court still views Ad-
vantaged and Disadvantaged as equally culpable, and it wishes to make
their sentences as nearly equal as possible.
After resentencing Disadvantaged, the court addresses defendants'
rule 35(a) and (b)(1) and section 2255 motions. Disadvantaged's mo-
tions relate to his first sentence, not imposed for the purpose of incapaci-
tation, rather than to his new rule 35(b)(2) sentence. In briefing his rule
35(a) and (b)(1) and section 2255 motions, therefore, he has directed his
arguments solely toward the implications of his initial sentence. Focus-
ing on standing, he argues that he may challenge the constitutionality of
the entire sentencing system, even though the alleged deficiencies do not
relate directly to the particular guidelines actually applied to him. It
202 Disadvantaged has been allowed to cross-examine the government's witnesses without
forsaking his objection to the proffered evidence.
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also sets forth his argument that his sentence is improper because it was
based on Advantaged's sentence, which in turn was influenced by the
judge's incorrect expectation that he would set Disadvantaged's sen-
tence according to the recommendations of the presentence investiga-
tion report. 20 3 The court questions the necessity, in view of the new
sentence, of ruling on the motions Disadvantaged has addressed to his
first sentence. Disadvantaged states, however, that he intends to peti-
tion for leave to appeal the court's decision to apply the guidelines advo-
cated by the government and change his sentence. Under these
circumstances, the court considers it necessary to decide his rule 35(a)
and (b)(1) and section 2255 motions. The court reasons that if the court
of appeals grants Disadvantaged leave to appeal and finds in his favor,
the original sentence will probably be reinstated;20 4 if so, the motions
will have to be addressed. It is in the interest ofjudicial economy for the
court to decide the motions now.
20 5
Turning to the merits of the rule 35 (a) and (b)(1) motions the judge
finds that counsel have added nothing new to their constitutional, statu-
tory, and guideline arguments. He adheres to his earlier rulings and
finds against defendants. Regarding the section 2255 motion, the court
hears two objections from the government. First, the government argues
that the court cannot hear the motion because the sentence is not yet
final. Under the system created by the new Code, a defendant must
pursue all his rule 35 motions to correct or vacate the sentence, as well as
a direct appeal of his sentence, if he has one, before the sentence can be
203 See note 194 & accompanying text supra.
204 While S. 1722 clearly delineates what the court of appeals can do when it finds a sen-
tence outside the guidelines to be unreasonable, S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 3725(e), the bill
gives no indication of what the higher court should do if it finds the lower court in error in a
rule 35(b)(2) ruling.
205 The court wishes to avoid having to rule on Disadvantaged's motions at a later time.
Especially since it must rule on Advantaged's rule 35(a) and (b)(1) and § 2255 motions, which
are identical to Disadvantaged's, it makes sense to dispose presently of all the motions.
For the same reasons the court declares that it will rule on Advantaged's argument that
his sentence improperly was set on the judge's mistaken supposition that he would follow the
recommendations of Disadvantaged's presentence investigation report. See note 194 & ac-
companying text supra. Although this motion is arguably moot, given Disadvantaged's new
sentence, it might become relevant again should Disadvantaged's old sentence be reinstated.
The mootness issue cannot be decided until the court of appeals acts on Disadvantaged's
petition for leave to appeal. If it grants the petition, determination of mootness must await
decision on the merits.
Even if the errors alleged and the briefs submitted in the rule 35(a) and (b)(l) and § 2255
motions addressing Disadvantaged's first sentence were identical to those required to oppose
the second sentence, it can be argued that a second round of motions and appeals would be
required in order to preserve the objections. The court might hold that all errors subject to
attack in the first sentencing will be abandoned unless raised again at the second sentencing.
The court of appeals, upon considering the first set of motions, might find them moot on the
theory that the subsequent sentencing was an entirely "new ballgame."
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considered "imposed" for section 2255 purposes. Second, the govern-
ment argues that a defendant cannot bring a section 2255 motion while
the appeal of his conviction is still pending, absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances.20 6 According to the government, no extraordinary circum-
stances exist in these cases which allow the court to hear defendants'
motions at this time. It is appropriate to wait because if defendants win
their appeals and their convictions are set aside, the challenges to their
sentences will be moot.
20 7
Defendants reply to the government's first argument by pointing to
title I, section 2302(b), which states that despite provisions allowing sub-
sequent modification, correction, or appeal of a sentence, "a judgment
of conviction that includes [a sentence to prison] constitutes a final judg-
ment for all other purposes. ' 20 8 Defendants note that "provisions al-
lowing subsequent modification, correction, or appeal" refers only to
those provisions for modification, correction, or appeal that are within
the Code.209 Since section 2255 is not part of the Code, it is an "other
purpose," and their sentences are therefore "final." Accordingly, they
argue, the motion is timely.
In response to the government's second argument, defendants note
that the courts have not claimed jurisdictional grounds for their practice
of refusing to hear section 2255 motions prior to resolution of the appeal
on the merits.210 Rather, the practice is a judge-made rule based on
considerations of judicial convenience and economy and the fear of in-
consistent rulings.21' The Code changes prior law requiring postpone-
ment of rule 35 motions until after resolution of the appeal on the
merits.212 Rule 35 motions under the Code generally will be resolved
before the appeal of the conviction. 213 In the case at bar, judicial con-
venience and economy dictate that defendants bring their section 2255
motions simultaneously with their rule 35 motions. In this manner, the
court may dispose of them in a single proceeding. Since the rule against
bringing section 2255 motions before resolution of the appeal is one of
administrative convenience, defendants argue, it "should not be uncom-
206 The government cites the following cases as support for its contention: United States v.
Davis, 604 F.2d 474,484-85 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Tindle, 522 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1968); Womack v. United States, 395
F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Moshers v. Eide, 353 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1965); Nemec v. United
States, 184 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1950).
207 Se Womack v. United States, 395 F.2d at 631; Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 333.
208 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 2302(b).
209 See id. § 2302(b)(1).
210 See Womack v. United States, 395 F.2d at 631.
211 See United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d at 485; Womack v. United States, 395 F.2d at 631;
Welsh v. United States 404 F.2d 333.
212 See note 275 & accompanying text infa,.
213 See id
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promisingly applied to effect an unfair result. 2 1 4
The court agrees with defendants that it is more sensible to allow
the section 2255 motion to be filed and prosecuted at this time, since the
constitutional and statutory arguments are the same as those made
under the rule 35 motions. The court rules against defendants on the
merits, however, for the same reasons adduced in denying the rule 35(a)
and (b)(1) motions.
2 15
2. Further Motions and the Appeals
Both defendants take separate appeals from the trial court's disposi-
tion of their rule 35(a) and (b)(1) and section 2255 motions. The gov-
ernment cross appeals the court's ruling that defendants can bring a
section 2255 motion while the appeal of a conviction is pending. Disad-
vantaged also petitions the court of appeals for leave to appeal the dis-
position of the government's rule 35 (b) (2) motion. The court of appeals,
without oral argument, grants the petition.2 1 6 The government then
cross-assigns error on the part of the district court in refusing to hear its
proffered evidence at the rule 35(b)(2) hearing.
Meanwhile, Disadvantaged launches an additional series of attacks
against his new, higher sentence. Resorting to rule 35(b)(2), he claims
that the court imposed his new sentence "as a result of incorrect applica-
tion of the sentencing guidelines. '2 17 In addition, he again moves for
relief under rule 35(a) and (b)(1) and section 2255, addressing his argu-
ments to the new sentence, which calls for incapacitation.
The trial court, in considering these new motions, finds that it can
no longer avoid ruling on the merits of Disadvantaged's claims because,
under the newly applied guidelines, Disadvantaged's sentence is for the
purpose of incapacitation, and consideration of his criminal back-
ground, as well as of his other personal characteristics, has served to
increase his sentence. The court rules that earlier Supreme Court law,
allowing consideration in sentencing of prior criminal conduct, whether
or not reduced to a conviction,2 18 still prevails under the new Code. De-
spite the radical changes the Code brings to the sentencing law,
21 9
214 United States v. Tindle, 522 F.2d 689, 693 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
215 See text following note 205 supra.
216 Currently statutory law does not indicate what should be included in a § 3724(d) peti-
tion for leave to appeal or the appropriate response. The Supreme Court must promulgate
rules governing these matters under title I, § 3722(a).
217 S. 1722, upra note 12, tit. II, § 111 (t). In this motion Disadvantaged argues that the
facts brought forth at the original sentencing hearing do not support selection of a defendant
category calling for incapacitation. He also claims that the judge misapplied the guidelines
because of the constitutional, statutory, and guideline deficiencies previously asserted.
218 See note 112 & accompanying text supra.
219 See, e.g., note 113 & accompanying text supra.
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Supreme Court precedent controls until the Court rules otherwise.
Likewise, the court rules that sentencing for the sole purpose of incapaci-
tation does not violate the due process clause,220 and that the Sentencing
Commission had ample evidence on which to base its predictive de-
vices. 22t It rejects Disadvantaged's arguments that the new Code
sentences according to status, rather than acts, 222 and that its provisions
are unconstitutionally vague.223 Further, the court finds no reason to
change its earlier ruling on the arguments that the sentencing purposes
of rehabilitation and incapacitation are irreconcilable,224 that the guide-
lines requiring imprisonment for the purpose of incapacitation imper-
missibly reflect considerations of rehabilitation inevitable in pre-Code
sentencing patterns225 and that use of the section 994(d) defendant crite-
ria violates the Code's neutrality requirement. 226
When the court turns to Disadvantaged's rule 35(b)(2) motion at-
tacking his new sentence, the government again proffers the evidence
buttressing the need to incapacitate Disadvantaged which it had sought
to enter on the first rule 35(b)(2) hearing. The court again refuses to
admit the evidence and then summarily rejects Disadvantaged's argu-
ments that the facts gathered at the original sentencing hearing do not
support selecting a category of defendant that requires incapacitation.
The court, accordingly, denies Disadvantaged's rule 35 and section 2255
motions addressed to his new sentence.
Disadvantaged subsequently petitions the court of appeals for leave
to appeal the trial court's disposition of this latest rule 35(b)(2) motion.
Since the matter of guideline application is already pending before the
court of appeals from the earlier 35(b)(2) proceeding, the court grants
the petition. The government then cross appeals the proffered evidence
question. Disadvantaged also appeals the court's decision in his new
rule 35(a) and (b)(1) and section 2255 proceedings.
The court of appeals now has pending before it a total of thirteen
appeals by the defendants and two cross appeals by the government.
227
220 See note 97 & accompanying text supra.
221 See notes 99-101 & accompanying text supra.
222 See note 116 & accompanying text supra.
223 See note 117 & accompanying text supra.
224 See text accompanying notes 159-60 supra.
225 See text accompanying note 163 supra.
226 See text accompanying note 161 supra.
227 The court of appeals has both defendants' appeals of their convictions and Ad-
vantaged's rule 35(a) and (b)(1) and § 2255 appeals, as well as the government's cross appeal
on the question of whether a § 2255 motion can be brought challenging a sentence while the
appeal of the conviction is still pending. Likewise, it has Disadvantaged's rule 35(a) and
(b)(1) and § 2255 motions relating to his first sentence and his appeal of the trial court's
disposition of the government's rule 35(b)(2) motion imposing a higher sentence. The court
of appeals also has the government's cross appeal on the question of admitting new evidence
1981]
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They have been consolidated into three groups, at the request of the
parties: the direct appeals from the defendants' convictions, the appeals
from the rule 35(a) and (b)(1) and section 2255 proceedings, and the
rule 35(b)(2) appeals.
228
One hundred and thirty-five days after the defendants' convictions,
at a rule 35(b)(2) hearing. Further, the court has Disadvantaged's rule 35(a) and (b)(1) and
§ 2255 appeals relating to his second sentence, as well as his appeal of the trial court's disposi-
tion of his rule 35(b)(2) motion.
228 At this point it might be useful to compare the respective time frames of defendants'
rule 35 activities and of their appeals from their convictions.
Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a defendant has ten days to file notice
of his intention to appeal his conviction. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b). He then has roughly 40 days
to have the record filed with the court of appeals, FED. R. App. P. 10(b)(1), 11 (b), and 40 days
after that to file his brief. The government then has 30 days to file its brief, and the appellant
has 14 days to reply. FED. R. APP. P. 31 (a). Assuming no extensions are granted, four and a
half months may pass between the time of the conviction and the time the last brief is filed.
The median time actually taken in 1979-80 was five months. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR A-I . The Fifth
Circuit normally reaches a decision in a criminal case submitted to the summary calendar,
FED. R. APP. P. 34(a), one and two-thirds months after briefing is closed. Direct criminal
appeals are submitted to oral argument one and a half months after briefing and, on the
average, are decided two months after submission. The total time from conviction to resolu-
tion of the appeal, then, is roughly six and two-thirds months on summary calendar, or eight
and one-half months if the appeal is argued.
Under rule 35(b)(2), as amended by S. 1722, a defendant must file a motion alleging
improper application of the guidelines within 120 days of the time his sentence is imposed. S.
1722, supra note 12, tit. II, § 111 (t). Current rule 35(b) has been construed to allow invoca-
tion of its provisions at any time within the 120-day limit. See note 197 supra. When motions
are filed near the end of the time limit, and an evidentiary hearing is required, or extensive
briefing is involved, the district court may be unable to dispose of the motion until well after
the 120-day period. It is not inconceivable that as many as five months may pass before the
rule 35(b)(2) motion is resolved. Under FED. R. APP. P. 4(b), defendants have ten days from
entry of a judgment or order to file notice of their intention to appeal. (The government has
30 days). We will assume that this general rule will be held applicable to petitions for leave to
appeal under the new Code. See S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 3723(b). It is impossible to
know at this point how much time the parties will be given to file briefs supporting and
opposing the petition for leave to appeal. Assuming, for the sake of discussion, that they have
a total of 40 days for briefing, and a three-judge panel of the court of appeals, using the
summary calendar procedure, takes an average of twenty days to grant or deny the petition,
seven and one-third months may have passed from the filing of the rule 35(b) (2) motion to the
granting of the petition for leave to appeal. If the petition is submitted to oral argument,
because one or more members of the panel wishes to hear argument or the case does not meet
the summary calendar criteria of FED. R. APP. P. 34(a), the court's disposition of the petition
may take much longer. Once the petition is granted, the record on appeal must be prepared
and filed, and further briefing on the merits of the district court's rule 35(b)(2) disposition
must follow. Thereafter, whether the merits of the appeal are disposed of summarily, or after
oral argument, more time must pass. A full year could pass before the guidelines appropriate
to the defendant's case are finally determined.
The rule 35(b)(1) process does not include the extra step of seeking leave to appeal.
Nevertheless, it is still quite possible that the court of appeals will resolve a rule 35(b)(1)
appeal after it has already acted on the defendant's appeal of his conviction. This could also
happen under rule 35(a), for motions under this section can be filed at any time. S. 1722,
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the court of appeals, according customary priority to criminal cases,2 29
decides on summary calendar the appeals taken from their convictions.
It reverses the convictions, and remands the cases for a new trial. The
court dismisses as moot the appeals based on the first round of sentence
attacks, which the parties are still in the process of briefing, and the
appeals based on the second round of attacks, notices of which have only
recently been filed.
III. FURTHER OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
A. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
The present federal sentencing system needs revision not only be-
cause of the great disparity in treatment it engenders,2 30 but also be-
cause of the irreconcilable conflict between the policy underlying the
current sentencing statutes and that underlying both the parole determi-
nation guidelines and presumptive release dates required under the Pa-
role Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976.231
The sentencing statutes were designed to implement several varia-
tions of the "medical model" concept. Under the medical model, the
judge sentences a defendant to an indeterminate term of imprison-
ment 232 for the purpose of rehabilitation.2 33 The Parole Commission, as
supra note 12, tit. II, § 111(t). Thus, motions under all three provisions of rule 35 could be
finally resolved after the appeal of the conviction is completed.
If, as in the hypothetical case, there is a second, or, theoretically, a third, rule 35(b)(2)
motion, the chances of the court of appeals deciding the appeal of the conviction, as well as
the appeal of a sentence outside the guidelines, before it acts on the rule 35(b)(2) petition and
any concommitant rule 35(a) and (b)(1) and § 2255 motions are even greater.
229 FED. R. App. P. 45(b).
230 See notes 2-5 & accompanying text supra.
231 Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18 U.S.C.).
Future references to specific parts of the Act will be to the Code section in which the part is
located.
232 Alan Dershowitz has defined indeterminate sentences as follows:
The indeterminate sentence is not a unitary concept of precise definition. It is a
continuum of devices designed to tailor punishment, particularly the duration of confine-
ment, to the rehabilitative needs and special dangers of the particular criminal (or more
realistically, the category of criminals).
A sentence is more or less indeterminate to the extent that the amount of time actu-
ally to be served is decided not by the judge at the time sentence is imposed, but rather
by an administrative board while the sentence is being served. Thus, a judicially im-
posed sentence of one day to life, the actual duration to be determined by the parole
board after service of sentence has commenced, is entirely indeterminate; a judicially
imposed sentence of life imprisonment with no possibility of parole (or other discretion-
ary reduction) is entirely determinate. Between these terminal points of the continuum
lie a wide range of more or less indeterminate sentences. A judicially imposed sentence
of not less than five or more than ten years is partially indeterminate: although its maxi-
mum and minimum are fixed at the time of sentencing, the actual time to be served
within those limits will be decided subsequently by some administrative authority. An-
other form of indeterminate sentence is the judicially imposed term of imprisonment for
what appears to be a fixed period, say ten years, but subject to the normal rules of parole,
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"doctor," monitors the defendant's response to treatment and decides
under which an administrative board has discretion to authorize release after a statuto-
rily prescribed percentage of "the sentence" has been served. Thus, all sentences subject
to parole (the vast majority of prison sentences imposed in the United States today) are
indeterminate to some degree.
Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 297,
297-98 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
Under the present sentencing statutes, all convicted offenders sentenced to prison will
receive a form of indeterminate sentence unless they have a life sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3651
(1976), or are sentenced to less than one year of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1976).
The "pure" medical model concept encompasses only the wholly indeterminate sentence.
233 Four federal sentencing statutes are relevant to this discussion. The first one, 18 U.S.C.
§ 4205 (1976), applies generally to adult offenders. It has three parts: § 4205(a) is the least
like the pure medical model, because sentences imposed under this subsection are only par-
tially indeterminate. The judge sets a definite term of imprisonment; once the offender has
completed one-third of that sentence, he is eligible for release on parole at any time the Parole
Commission designates. Subsection (b)(2) is the fully indeterminate sentence; it allows a
judge to fix a maximum term of imprisonment but specify that the Parole Commission can
release the prisoner on parole at any time prior to that maximum. Subsection (b)(1) is a
compromise between subsections (a) and (b) (2), allowing the judge to designate a maximum
sentence and a minimum time that the offender must spend in prison, after which the Parole
Commission may elect to place him on parole. The minimum time designated must be less
than one-third of the offender's total sentence.
The Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1976), allows the judge to
forego sentencing under the law a youth has been convicted of breaking and instead "sen-
tence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision
. . . until discharged by the [Parole] Commission. . . ." Id § 5010(b). Rehabilitative treat-
ment is to be provided in special facilities. Id § 5011. The Parole Commission releases
youthful offenders on parole according to the same basic criteria used for adults in 18 U.S.C.
§ 4206 (1976), however. Id § 5017(a). See Deperalta v. Garrison, 575 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir.
1978); Fronczak v. Warden, El Reno Reformatory, 553 F.2d 1219, 1221 (10th Cir. 1977). See
generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE SENTENCING OPTIONS OF FEDERAL DISTRICT
JUDGES 27-32 (1980); Gottshall, Sentencing the Youth and Young Adult Oender, FED. PROBATION,
June 1962, at 17.
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-55 (1976), the Narcotic Addicts Act, a judge may "place [an
offender] in the custody of the Attorney General for an examination to determine whether he
is an addict and is likely to be rehabilitated through treatment." Id §4252. If the results are
positive, the judge may commit the offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treat-
ment. The commitment is "for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed ten years, but
in no event shall it exceed the maximum sentence that could otherwise have been imposed."
Id § 4253(a). After a mandatory six months of treatment, id § 4254, the offender can be
released at any time the Parole Commission designates, id § 4254. The criteria the Parole
Comrpission uses are similar to those used for offenders sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4206. See
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra, at 33-36.
Finally, the Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42 (1976), allows the district
court to commit juveniles to the custody of the Attorney General for a period not to extend
"beyond the juvenile's twenty-first birthday or the maximum term which could have been
imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense, whichever is sooner. . . ." Id § 5037(b).
Once committed, a juvenile delinquent "may be released on parole at any time under such
conditions and regulations as the United States Parole Commission deems proper" in accord-
ance with 28 U.S.C. § 4206 (1976). Id § 5041.
All of the above sentencing provisions clearly were fashioned primarily to serve the pur-
pose of rehabilitation. The hybrids, those provisions that set a minimum time that the of-
fender must remain in prison before the Parole Commission may release him, might be said to
serve the purposes of punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation as well as that of rehabilita-
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when he is "cured." The prisoner is released as soon as he is fully reha-
bilitated.
234
Over the years, however, many experts have grown disillusioned
with the medical model. 235 Studies have failed to demonstrate that in-
stitutional rehabilitation programs are effective or that the Parole Com-
mission is capable of determining the optimal time for release.
236
Further, behavior in prison has been found an unsatisfactory predictor
of future criminal conduct. 237 In addition to questioning the effective-
ness of the medical model, many have criticized indeterminate sentences
as being inhumane. Opponents of indeterminate sentences have
claimed that "the psychological stress engendered by not knowing one's
release date is morally unjustifiable," 238 and adds to prison unrest.
23 9
They have advocated a system that would allow the prisoner to know
his release date as early in the process as possible.
There have also been frequent expressions of concern about the
great disparity in the sentefices of similarly situated defendants under
the medical model. 240 Many people have sought to alleviate that dis-
parity by advocating a parole system that would release similarly situ-
ated defendants at the same time, regardless of their original
sentences.
24'
In the late 1960s, prompted by these and other concerns, the Parole
Commission began to develop guidelines to be followed in the parole
tion. By requiring offenders to spend at least one-third of their sentences in prison, for in-
stance, § 4205(a) ensures that the offender will receive a certain measure of punishment and
that society will be protected from his future crimes for that length of time. Further, other
potential offenders might be deterred by the prospect of spending at least one-third of a sen-
tence in prison if they commit the offense.
234 Accordingly, the decision about when the offender will be released is not made until he
has served at least part of his sentence. Hearings on the prisoner's progress are held periodi-
cally until he is deemed ready for release or until his sentence is served in full.
From the perspective of the traditional rehabilitative model, this practice is both
necessary and desirable. Under a treatment philosophy, parole release decisions are to
be based primarily on rehabilitative concerns. The goal of the parole release authority is
to identify the "optimum time" for the prisoner's release. Thus, deferral of the ielease
decision is necessary to enable rehabilitative progress to be monitored.
Hoffman & Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy, and the Parole
Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 91 (1979).
235 See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra, note 232, at 319-23.
236 Hoffman & Stover, supra note 234, at 91. See Alschuler, Sentencing Reform andfPosecutorial
Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
550, 551-55 (1978).
237 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 233, at 18-20; Hoffman & Stover, supra note
234, at 91; Project, supra note 101, at 873-74.
238 Hoffman & Stover, supra note 234, at 92. See also N. MORRIS, supra note 98, at 43;
Alschuler, supra note 236, at 553.
.239 Id
240 See, e.g., Gottfredson, Parole Guidelines and the Reduction of Sentencing Disparity, 16 J. RE-
SEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 218 (1979).
241 See, e.g., id; Hoffman & Stone-Meierhoefer, supra note 22.
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decisionmaking process.2 4 2 The Parole Commission and Reorganization
Act of 1976 adopts the concept of using guidelines for parole decisions,
and mandates continued use of the guideline system. 243 The guidelines
apply uniformly to defendants, no matter which version of the medical
model sentencing scheme was used to incarcerate them.
244
The guidelines the Parole Commission uses operate much like the
sentencing guidelines proposed in S. 1722. They take the form of a two-
axis chart. One axis, labeled "Offense Characteristics," is used to indi-
cate the severity or gravity of the prisoner's' offense, and ranges from
"low" to "greatest II." The horizontal axis, labeled "Offender Charac-
teristics," provides four categories, ranging from "very good" to
c"poor. ' 245 The guidelines establish a range of release dates for each
combination of offense and offender characteristics. 246 The Commission
must set the prisoner's parole date within that range unless it determines
that there is "good cause" for doing otherwise.247 If it does refrain from
applying the guideline-prescribed date, the Commission must give the
prisoner "written notice stating with particularity the reasons for its de-
termination, including a summary of the information relied upon. '248
A prisoner is released pursuant to the guidelines if he has "substan-
tially observed the rules of the institution '249 of confinement and if the
Parole Commission, "upon consideration of the nature and circum-
stances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner,
determines (1) that release would not depreciate the seriousness of his
offense or promote disrespect for the law; and (2) that release would not
jeopardize the public welfare. ' 250 In effect, under the 1976 Act, the pri-
mary consideration in determining parole is no longer rehabilitation, as
is required under the medical model. Rather, like S. 1722, the Act dis-
242 Hoffman & Stone-Meierhoefer, supra note 22, at 63; Hoffman & Stover, supra note 234,
at 102-03.
243 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a)(1) (1976).
244 See S. REP. No. 94-369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, repintedin [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 335, 340. See note 233 supra.
245 For a copy of the guidelines, see 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979). An offender's placement
within the four offender categories depends on his salient factor score. The salient factor score
is a number between 0 and 11 that is derived from the answers to seven questions about the
offender. These questions deal with the offender's prior convictions, prior incarcerations,
prior revocations of parole, age at first commitment, commitment offense, drug history, and
employment history. See Hoffman & Stover, supra note 234, at 207. Cf S. 1722, supra note 12,
tit. III, §§ 994(d)-(e).
246 Cf S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(b) ("The Commission. . . shall, for each cate-
gory of offense involving each category of defendant, establish a sentencing range. .. .
247 18 U.S.C. §§ 4206(a)-(c) (1976). See Hoffman & Stover, supra note 234, at 108. Cf S.
1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 2003(b) ("The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and
within the range, described in [the guidelines] unless the court finds that an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance exists .... 2).
248 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) (1976). Compare S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, § 2003(c)(2).




cards rehabilitation and focuses upon punishment, deterrence and inca-
pacitation.
251
The 1976 Act also requires, in many cases, that the Commission
notify prisoners with indeterminate sentences of their presumptive re-
lease dates within 120 days of imprisonment. 252 This practice makes it
impossible for the Parole Commission to consider progress toward reha-
bilitation in setting release dates for these offenders. Indeed, all of the
information considered in the process of determining release on parole is
known at the time of sentencing.
253
Although the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act's success
in eliminating sentence disparity and prison unrest is debatable, it
clearly departs from the medical model used in current sentencing stat-
utes. The 1976 Act, in effect, turns indeterminate sentences into deter-
minate sentences. When a judge imposes an indeterminate or partly
indeterminate sentence for the purpose of rehabilitation, his intent will
be frustrated. In effect, he will only be delegating to the Parole Com-
mission the task of resentencing the prisoner for the purposes of deter-
rence, punishment, and incapacitation, based on the same information
he possessed himself. Therefore, the sentencing statutes and the statutes
governing the actions of the Parole Commission are in irreconcilable
conflict. The Congress must determine which approach it wishes to pre-
vail.
B. MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED IN EVALUATING S. 1722
The need for sentencing reform is manifest. Before acting, how-
ever, legislators must evaluate carefully the many approaches to allevi-
ating the problems in the current federal sentencing scheme. The
provisions of S. 1722 cannot be evaluated standing alone. Congress must
consider them in the context of the criminal justice system as a whole.
The following are some matters that need special consideration.
251 Under the Parole Commission guidelines the minimum prison term prescribed under
the offense severity rating, that applies to all offenders regardless of their characteristics,
serves the purposes of punishment and deterrence. Any extra time served because of offender
characteristics achieves the purpose of incapacitation. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra
note 233, at 18-21; Project, supra note 101, at 873-74.
252 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a) (1976). In its regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act, the
Parole Commission requires that an initial hearing be conducted within 120 days of a pris-
oner's incarceration unless his sentence includes a minimum term of parole eligibility of ten
years or more. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(a) (1979). Following this hearing the Commission must set a
presumptive release date. Id § 2.12(b).
253 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 983-84. Good institutional adjustment is assumed when the
release date is set. 28 C.F.R. § 212(d) (1979).
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I. Alleviation of Unwarranted Disparity
Although one of the primary purposes of S. 1722 is to alleviate un-
warranted sentencing disparity, 25 4 it is highly questionable whether it
can accomplish this end in its current form. There are four primary
components in the criminal justice system: the police, the prosecutor,
thejudge, and the Parole Commission. Each of these four enjoys consid-
erable discretion that may affect directly the sentence of an offender
going through the system.2 55 S. 1722 sharply limits the discretion of
judges and abolishes the Parole Commission, but it makes no attempt to
control the discretion of the federal police or the United States Attor-
neys.
The federal police agencies may have considerable influence on the
sentence an offender ultimately may face, though this influence is sel-
dom publicized or discussed. Law enforcement officials decide what to
investigate and when to arrest. They set their own investigation priori-
ties according to their resources and the type of criminal violations prev-
alent in a given geographical area. Since investigative criteria vary from
one part of the country to another, suspected violators receive disparate
treatment.
256
The federal government has numerous specialized police agencies:
the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion; the Secret Service; the Immigration and Naturalization Service;
the Customs Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the
Internal Revenue Service, and the Postal Service are only some of the
better known ones. Many criminal transactions may violate several laws
and implicate more than one federal police agency. For instance, in a
drug smuggling case, the Drug Enforcement Agency or Customs Service
254 See S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(o.
255 The discretion of four other entities also affects an offender's ultimate sentence: (1) The
Congress is the first participant in the sentencing function; it prescribes sanctions for offenses
and the sentencing options available to the judge. (2) The probation officer, through his
presentence investigation report, may influence the judge in fashioning the sentence. He may
also influence the Parole Commission in determining the offender's parole release date, since
the presentence investigation report is the basic document on which the Commission bases its
deliberations. See 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1976). (3) The Bureau of Prisons may affect the term of
imprisonment the offender actually serves through its method of classifying offenders and
assigning them to correctional facilities. A facility's conditions of confinement may play a
major role in determining whether the offender makes good institutional adjustment. For
instance, if the offender is assigned to a "safe" institution, where there is relatively little crimi-
nal influence in his surroundings, he may be less likely to be held beyond his presumptive
release date due to his misbehavior while in the facility. (4) Finally, the offender's defense
counsel has an impact on the sentence imposed. Generally, the more competent the defense
counsel is the more able he may be in obtaining plea bargaining concessions from the prose-
cutor.
256 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REDUCING FEDERAL JUDICIAL SENTENCING AND
PROSECUTING DISPARITIES: A SYSTEMWIDE APPROACH NEEDED 16 (1979).
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might be primarily involved, but if the offenders have used interstate
facilities, the Federal Bureau of Investigation might also consider the
matter. Generally, only one agency, the one that first becomes involved
in a case, carries it through to prosecution. Because of their specializa-
tion, these agencies are likely to concentrate on the violation of different
laws. Indeed, more than simple expertise may motivate an agency to
pursue only those violations that fall within its own legislatively man-
dated jurisdiction. Each agency wishes to justify its existence as a spe-
cialized bureaucratic entity and to increase its own funding. Since
prosecutions for violations of laws under another agency's jurisdiction
will do little to further these goals, the agency will concentrate its inves-
tigation on the area of law that is in its particular care. In so doing, it
may fail to advise the prosecutor objectively, so that he may fail to
charge the most serious offense demonstrable by the evidence.
257
Prosecutorial discretion has an even greater influence on an of-
fender's sentence than police discretion 258 and harbors many of the evils
257 If the prosecutor fails to charge the most serious offense demonstrable by the evidence,
the seeds of disparity have been sown.
"The most serious offense demonstrable by the evidence" encompasses charges that are
reduced because of obvious practical and legitimate prosecutorial considerations, such as the
availability of witnesses and the likelihood that leniency will induce the defendant to testify
against others.
258 United States Attorneys exercise discretion in deciding whether to prosecute, what
charges to bring, and whether to reduce charges or plea bargain a case. As a result of this
discretion, the prosecutor controls the possibility of punishment and, in many cases, the range
of sentence the judge can impose. As the Comptroller General explained in a recent report:
Because of heavy workloads, lack of evidence, insufficient staff, and/or because the
complaint did not warrant the cost of prosecution, U.S. attorneys declined to prosecute
62 percent of the criminal complaints available for prosecution during fiscal years 1970
to 1976. In order to handle the large number of complaints, each U.S. attorney has
established his own priorities and guidelines for declining cases. . . . These guidelines,
however, are not uniform, nor do they reflect a national policy. As a result, disparity in
criminal prosecutions may occur when a defendant in one district is formally charged
with an offense but never prosecuted, whereas another defendant, similarly charged-in
the same or another district-is prosecuted. ...
The offense charged and plea bargains may also affect a defendant's sentence by
limiting the sentencing options available to a judge. For example, there are frequently a
number of different statutes under which a defendant may be prosecuted for a particular
criminal act. These criminal statutes may carry different maximum sentences. The U.S.
attorney's decision to prosecute an offense under a particular criminal statute can affect
the sentence range available upon conviction. To illustrate, a person accused of bank
robbery can be charged with "bank robbery," which has a maximum penalty of $5,000
and 20 years, or "stealing from a bank," which has a $5,000 and 10-year maximum
sentence. Subject to considerations involving the sufficiency of evidence, U.S. attorneys
have discretion to charge a defendant accused of armed bank robbery with either one or
both of these statutes. This can result in similarly situated defendants being charged and
possibly convicted under different statutes, thereby restricting the maximum sentence a
judge can impose.
U.S. attorneys also have authority to plea bargain with defendants, whereby charges
will be dropped or reduced in exchange for a guilty plea to a lesser offense. . . . [P]lea
bargaining occurs in a large percentage of criminal cases. Plea bargaining can have a
significant effect on the disposition and sentence of a convicted defendant. Since U.S.
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of judicial discretion. In a recent article, Professor Alschuler compared
the relative evils of judicial and prosecutorial discretion:
There is hardly any objection to judicial sentencing discretion that does
not apply in full measure to prosecutorial sentencing discretion-a discre-
tion which has been, in practice, every bit as broad and broader. As much
as judicial discretion, the discretion of American prosecutors lends itself to
inequalities and disparities of treatment because of disagreements concern-
ing issues of sentencing policy. Like judicial discretion, prosecutorial dis-
cretion permits at least the occasional dominance of illegitimate
considerations such as race and personal or political influence in sentenc-
ing decisions. It may also lead to a general perception of unfairness, arbi-
trariness and uncertainty and may even undercut the deterrent force of the
criminal law.
There are additional objections to prosecutorial sentencing discretion
that do not apply with nearly so much force to judicial discretion. The
exercise of prosecutorial discretion is more frequently made contingent
upon a waiver of constitutional rights. It is generally exercised less openly.
It is more likely to be influenced by considerations of friendship and by
reciprocal favors of a dubious character. It is commonly exercised for the
purpose of obtaining convictions in cases in which guilt could not be
proven at trial. It is usually exercised by people of less experience and less
objectivity than judges. It is commonly exercised on the basis of less infor-
mation than judges possess. Indeed, its exercise may depend less upon con-
siderations of desert, deterrence and reformation than upon a desire to
avoid the hard work of preparing and trying cases. In short, prosecutorial
discretion has the same faults as judicial discretion and more.
259
Assessing the provisions of S. 1437,260 the predecessor to S. 1722,
Professor Steven Schulhofer has pointed out that while a reform plan
limiting the discretion ofjudges and the Parole Commission may reduce
abuse and arbitrary decisions by those officials, it may also "limit their
ability to counteract abuses of prosecutorial power in plea negotia-
tion. '26 1 Currently, the various components of the sentencing system
attorneys do not have systematic procedures and controls governing the use of plea bar-
gaining, the opportunity for disparate plea bargaining decisions is significant.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 256, at 15-16. See generally Holderman, Pre-
indictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the Federal System, 71 J. GRIM. L. & C. 1 (1980); Mellon,
Jacoby & Brewer, The Prosecutor Constrained by his Environment: A New Look at DiscretionayJnstice
in the United States, 72 J. GRIM. L. & C. 52 (1981); Comment, Duplicative Statutes, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and the Illinois Armed Violence Statute, 71 J. GRIM. L. & C. 226 (1980).
259 Alschuler, supra note 236, at 564 (citations omitted).
260 S. 1437, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
261 Schulhofer, Due Process in Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 733, 742-43 (1980).
Moreover, even if overall disparity did not increase, the quality of the discretion exer-
cised might be adversely affected because, in effect, discretion would be transferred from
federal district judges to assistant United States attorneys. No matter how conscientious
they are, assistant United States attorneys are almost uniformly far younger and less
experienced than district judges, and their decisions are typically far less visible.
1 S. SCHULHOFER, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM 1-3
(1979) (report of studies performed under contract with the Federal Judicial Center). See also
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tend to offset one another and control excesses. If two are limited and
another is left with no checks on its discretion, even greater sentencing
disparities may be generated than those resulting from the present sys-
tem.
Chief Judge Donald Lay, speaking for the Judicial Conference of
the Eighth Circuit, has agreed that reform provisions restricting the ju-
diciary, but not the prosecution, not only may fail to curb disparity but
may in fact enhance it. In a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy, then
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, about the sentencing pro-
visions of S. 1722, he stated:
The prosecutor already plays a considerable role in the decision as to
how long an offender may be incarcerated; the prosecutor selects a statute
on which to base the charge and, thus, establishes the maximum possible
term of imprisonment, and through the plea bargaining process, he may
fashion the sentence actually handed down. Under S. 1722, the prosecu-
tor, having preindictment notice of the precise sentencing guidelines that
would apply to the putative defendant, could control the sentencing
judge's exercise of the very narrow discretion allotted him under the bill
[and] be confident of obtaining a particular sentence. He would simply
choose a charge that would produce the desired sentence. We question the
wisdom of placing that kind of discretion in the typical Assistant United
States Attorney whether or not his exercise of that discretion is supervised
personally by the United States Attorney.
2 62
Under S. 1722 the Sentencing Commission has some leeway in con-
structing its policy statements and guidelines and its choices may affect
the amount of influence prosecutors ultimately have on sentencing. Ac-
cording to a recent study, prosecutorial influence will be stronger if the
Commission strictly curtails judicial discretion, and weaker if the Com-
mission takes a more lenient approach.2 63 Even if the Sentencing Coin-
Coffee, supra note 98, at 979; McCall, The Future of Parole-In Rebuttal of S 1437, FED. PROBA-
TION, Dec. 1978, at 6.
262 Letter from Donald P. Lay, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee
(August 12, 1980). See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 256, at 20-21.
263 1 S. SCHULHOFER, .supra note 261. See also Schulhofer, supra note 261, at 749-51. The
study, which involved the provisions of S. 1437, the predecessor of S. 1722, pinpointed several
issues whose resolution might affect the degree of prosecutional influence on sentencing al-
lowed under the bill:
The 'in-out" decision. The commission could promulgate guidelines that, for most
cases, would make no recommendation on the vitally important question whether the
offender should be imprisoned. The guidelines could leave this decision to the unguided
discretion of the judge and indicate only the term to be served if imprisonment were in
fact imposed. Alternatively, commission guidelines could make a definite recommenda-
tion for or against incarceration in every offense-offender category, enhancing the impor-
tance of the prosecutor's characterization of the charges.
Prison sentencesfor nonviolent offenders. [The bill] requires that the sentencing guidelines
generally specify a sentence other than imprisonment for "a first offender who has not
been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense." IS. 1722, supra
note 12, tit. III, § 994(b)] In determining which nonviolent offenses are "serious," the
1981]
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mission did everything possible under the existing provisions of S. 1722
commission will again influence the range of cases over which imprisonment will be re-
quired, foreclosed, or left to the discretion of the sentencing judge.
Longer prison terms for certain offenders. The bill mandates a substantial term of impris-
onment for offenders associated with "racketeering" or deriving a substantial livelihood
from criminal activity. Proof of these factors is likely to remain within the control of the
United States attorney's office, but the significance of this prosecutorial power will de-
pend upon the commission's decision regarding the length of the additional prison term
that will be triggered once the required showing is made.
Width of the guideline sentencing range. For any offense-offender category, the recom-
mended term of imprisonment could consist of a single number, or the guidelines could
be stated as a range within which choice would be left to the judge's discretion . ..
Range of offnse and ofender information. In identifying the facts that will determine
which offense and offender category applies in a given case, the commission could restrict
consideration to information readily ascertainable by the probation service, so that deci-
sions concerning the offense-offender category would be relatively immune from manipu-
lation by prosecution and defense. Alternatively, the commission could cause certain
facts ordinarily developed only by the prosecution (e.g., scope of the criminal enterprise)
to become critical. Beyond this, the commission could require that the prosecution al-
lege and prove all offense or offender characteristics deemed aggravating. Under this
approach, the prosecution could influence the offense-offender determination even on
issues for which the necessary information could be obtained without its cooperation.
Aggravating and mitigatingfactors not used to establish ofene-oender categories. Inevitably,
some relevant circumstances will not be included in the initial calculation of the offense-
offender category. The commission could specify that the existence of such circum-
stances should normally justify variations within the authorized guidelines range, speci-
fied departures from the guidelines range, or even departures determined on an ad hoc
basis by the sentencing judge.
Inter-district variation. [The bill] permits the commission to preserve a substantial
area of judicial sentencing discretion by authorizing departures from the guidelines on
the basis of local circumstances-either the incidence of a kind of offense or the commu-
nity concern generated by a particular crime.
Guiltypleas. The commission could choose to preserve or restrict another important
source of judicial discretion by specifying that the entry of a guilty plea should be given
no weight, a specified weight, or a weight to be determined by the sentencing judge.
Multiple counts and charges. Over a wide range of situations involving conviction on
several counts, the commission could forbid incremental penalties, eliminating a signifi-
cant source of both prosecutorial and judicial discretion. And in the few areas in which
the bill appears to require some incremental penalty, the commission could achieve a
similar result by prescribing only a modest increase in the severity of punishment. Alter-
natively, commission guidelines could specify a very substantial incremental penalty in
most multi-count situations. This approach would still constrain judicial discretion, but
it would enormously enhance the significance of the prosecutor's charging discretion; the
prosecutor's sentencing power in fact would become far greater than it is under current
law. Finally, the commission could leave questions concerning the existence and extent
of any incremental penalty for the sentencing judge to determine on a case-by-case basis.
If implemented in this way, [the bill] would not only preserve but would probably en-
hance the unchecked discretionary power of the trial judge, because the Parole Commis-
sion would no longer be able to order early release for offenders receiving aberrantly long
terms as a result of cumulative sentences.
1 S. SCHULHOFER, supra note 261, at 23-28. See also 2 S. SCHULHOFER, supra note 261, at 1-
34.
A couple of Professor Schulhofer's points evoke response. First, it seems unlikely that the
Sentencing Commission could or would delegate the "in-out" decision to the unguided discre-
tion of thejudge. The overriding spirit and intent of S. 1722 indicates that judges should not
have full discretion in such important matters. Also, S. 1722 specifically requires'the Com-
mission to direct judges not to imprison certain first offenders, S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III,
§ 994(i), and to imprison those meeting the criteria of § 994(h). Id § 994(h).
Further, restricting the facts that can be considered in determining offender and offense
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to keep prosecutorial discretion in check, however, amendments to the
bill would probably be needed to ensure control of both prosecutorial
and judicial discretion.264 One suggestion that has been made for curb-
ing prosecutorial discretion is that judges be instructed to ignore the
offense for which the defendant was charged and convicted and to use
his "real offense" to determine the appropriate "category of offense" and
sentence.265 Under this approach, it is claimed that prosecutorial tinker-
ing with the charge would not influence the sentence. A second sugges-
tion is that judges be authorized to "forbid or restrict charge
bargaining" and to "reject charge-reduction plea agreements. ' 266 Yet
another suggestion is that the Congress eliminate plea bargaining and
simply specify the exact reward that defendants will receive for pleading
guilty; for instance, the entry of a guilty plea could be treated as "a
mitigating factor leading to a specified reduction in penalty.
'267
I do not propose to delve into the merits of these proposals here. I
only stress that Congress must study carefully the problems of sentenc-
ing disparity engendered by uncontrolled police and prosecutorial dis-
cretion, and fully explore possible remedies. A piecemeal approach to
sentencing reform is unlikely to work. Any attempts to alleviate sen-
tencing disparity must be examined in the context of the whole criminal
justice system. Only from that vantage point can Congress properly re-
allocate the exercise of discretion and install the necessary checks and
balances. 26
8
Congress also should consider carefully the degree and type of dis-
categories to those contained in the probation report would interfere with the sentencing
court's fact-finding duty and could deprive the parties of due process. Neither the Sentencing
Commission nor the court properly could delegate the fact-finding duty to the probation
officer, and it seems unlikely that they would attempt to do so.
264 See I S. SCHULHO"ER, supra note 261, at 5, 31.
265 See id at 49-72; Schulhofer, supra note 261, at 757-72.
266 Schulhofer, supra note 261 at 772-98. See I S. SCHULHOFER, supra note 261, at 73-132.
Congress amended S. 1722 to require the Sentencing Commission to issue policy state-
ments concerning the appropriate use of "the authority granted under Rule 1 (e) (2) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to accept or reject a plea agreement entered into pursu-
ant to Rule 11(e)(l)." S. 1722,supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(a)(2)(D). On its face this provision
does not promise resolution of the problem of prosecutorial discretion. But see S. REP. No. 96-
553 at 1236-37 (§ 994(a)(2)(D) of the Code was meant "to provide an opportunity for mean-
ingful judicial review of proposed charge-reduction plea agreements.")
The existing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), which S. 1722 does not purport
to change, requires that a prosecutor obtain leave of court before filing a dismissal of an
indictment, information, or complaint. The primary purpose of this requirement, however, is
to prevent harassment of defendants, United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965), and so the rule is of questionable use in providing day-by-day
judicial control over prosecutorial discretion. See 3 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 199,
§ 812.
267 Alschuler, supra note 236, at 575-76.
268 See GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, supra note 256, at 19.
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parity potentially perpetuated or generated by use of the section 994(d)
defendant characteristics. 2 69 Considering the disparity that may result
from their use, is there sufficient evidence that these characteristics are
truly relevant to legitimate sentencing considerations to justify their in-
clusion in the Code? Furthermore, what will be the effect of a judge's
specifically local consideration of "the community view of the gravity of
the offense" and "the public concern generated by the offense"?
2 70 Will
such considerations lead to inappropriate inter-circuit disparity?2 71 Fi-
nally, Congress should consider whether the very complexity of the Act
might lead to difficult or undesirable variations in interpretation that
will result in unwarranted sentencing disparity.
2. Appellate Review
The hypothetical case illustrated some of the numerous paths par-
ties might puruse to obtain appellate review under S. 1722. As noted
earlier, title I, section 3725 allows the defendant and the government a
direct, immediate appeal of sentences imposed outside the guidelines,
2 72
and rule 35, as amended, allows either party to seek simultaneous review
of any sentence in the sentencing court. The defendant subsequently
may appeal the sentencing court's disposition of a rule 35(a) or (b)(1)
motion,2 7 3 and both the defendant and the government may petition for
leave to appeal the disposition of a rule 35(b)(2) motion. 274 Rules
35(b)(1) and (b)(2) require, and rule 35(a) allows, review to be insti-
gated immediately after the judge pronounces sentence, even though the
defendant contests on direct appeal the merits of his conviction and the
reasonableness of a sentence outside the guidelines.
275
269 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(d).
270 Id §§ 994(c)(4)-(5).
271 See 1974 Hearings, supra note 5, at 8083 (statement of William James Zumwalt).
272 There are exceptions: sentences for misdemeanors of Class B and below may not be
appealed, and sentences resulting from plea bargains, under certain circumstances, may not
be appealed. S. 1722, supra note 12, .tit. I, § 3725.
273 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Although the government may not appeal in these cases, see
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976), it may seek review through a writ of mandamus under extraordinary
circumstances when the judge clearly has violated his duty. See United States v. Lane, 284
F.2d 935, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1960).
274 S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. I, §§ 3723(b), 3724(d).
In practice, appellate review of guideline application is likely as a matter of course either
through granting petitions for leave to appeal or in the context of appeals from rule 35(a) and
(b)(1) and § 2255 orders. The sentencing court's resolution of rule 35(a), (b)(1), and § 2255
motions may well, directly or indirectly, have encompassed guideline issues cognizable under
rule 35(b)(2).
275 Under the currently existing rule 35, a sentence may not be reduced or corrected while
the defendant's appeal of his conviction is pending. See Berman v. United States, 302 U.S.
211, 214 (1937); United States v. Mack, 466 F.2d 333, 340 (D.C. Cir.); cert. denied, 409 U.S.
952 (1972); United States v. Bums, 446 F.2d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 1971); 8a MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 35.021] (2d ed. 1980). Therefore, when a defendant appeals, the rule allows him
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The defendant also can use 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to attack his sentence.
Under this provision he may move the sentencing court to vacate his
sentence on grounds, inter alia, that it "was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States . .. or . . .was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law."1276 As noted earlier, current law re-
quires, absent extraordinary circumstances, postponement of a section
2255 motion until after resolution of the conviction appeal.277 However,
since it no longer will be necessary to wait to bring rule 35 motions,
which may be very similar to a habeas petition, defendants undoubtedly
will attempt to bring their section 2255 motions prior to resolution of
their appeals. Both the government and the defendant may appeal
from the court's disposition of a section 2255 attack.
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The overall effect of the S. 1722 sentencing reform provisions is to
create three specialized categories of appellate review of a sentence: (1)
appeal of sentencing outside the guidelines, (2) appeal of the guideline
application, and (3) appeal of the legality of the sentence in other con-
texts. Whether or not Congress so intended, through this maze of par-
ticularlized attacks and procedures it has provided nearly full appellate
review. As is illustrated in the hypothetical case, however, this piece-
meal review will produce three highly unsatisfactory results. First, it
will involve a substantial waste ofjudicial and para-judicial resources.
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to move to correct a sentence "within 120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued
upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal or within 120 days after entry of
any order of judgment of the Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of up-
holding, a judgment of conviction." FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
S. 1722 restricts the period of filing motions to correct an illegally or erroneously imposed
sentence to "within 120 days after the sentence is imposed." S. 1722, supra note 12, tit. II,
§ 111 (t). According to the legislative history, "the 120 days runs, under the proposed Rule,
only from the time of sentence, and not, as under present Rule 35, from the date of court
action on direct appeal upholding the judgment of conviction." S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1213
n.76. Thus, the amendment indicates that Congress envisions proceedings to correct
sentences while appeals are pending, contrary to prior practice. The only alternative expla-
nation for the amendment is that Congress wanted to prohibit defendant from simultaneously
appealing his conviction and seeking review under rule 35. The proposed law thus would
force him to choose between his right to appeal his conviction and his right to seek a correc-
tion of his sentence; it is unlikely that Congress intended to impose this dilemma.
276 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). Arguably, a sentence imposed above the guidelines but not
supported by the requisite § 2003(b) findings could be a sentence "in excess of the maximum
authorized by law." Also, it is arguable that an erroneous application of the guidelines could
result in such an "excess" sentence. For instance, a defendant sentenced to five years impris-
onment, a term within the guidelines that the court chose, might contend that if the court
had applied the "correct" guidelines, he would have received no more than four years impris-
onment. If the defendant is right, he received a sentence in excess of that authorized by law-
the guidelines having the force of law.
277 See note 206 & accompanying text supra.
278 See United States v. Williamson, 255 F.2d 512, 515-16 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 941 (1959).
279 Trial courts, of course, will attempt to maximize efficiency. For instance, they un-
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The paperwork involved will be many times greater than what one di-
doubtedly will resort to the kinds of techniques used to ready cases for trial. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 17.1 provides for pretrial conferences in criminal cases. Arguably, this
rule would allow a presentencing conference. If not, the courts have inherent power to order
such conferences under their power to manage cases.
The starting-point in a presentencing conference should be the presentence investigation.
If counsel do not dispute the factual recitations contained in the presentence investigation
report, and they agree that the guidelines and concomitant policy statements recommended
in the report control the judge's sentencing discretion, then they can so stipulate. At such
times, the sentencing hearing will be routine, limited to argument over the selection of the
sentence from the sentencing range prescribed by the guidelines. This supposition assumes
that neither party plans to insist on a sentence outside the guidelines. If a party announces its
intent to seek a sentence outside the guidelines, the court can inquire about the type of proof
he will offer to satisfy the § 2003(b) requirements and the nature of his opponent's rebuttal, if
any. This inquiry will define this narrow issue and facilitate a streamlined presentation at the
hearing.
If either party disputes the factual recitations of the presentence investigation report, the
court can ask counsel to relate his understanding of the true facts and the set of Sentencing
Commission guidelines and policy statements he believes applicable to such facts. With rep-
resentations of counsel in hand, the court will be able to frame adequately the issues of fact to
be tried. The facts deemed relevant depend on the criteria that underpin the defendant cate-
gory in the selected set of guidelines. The number of fact issues to be tried at the sentencing
hearing thus will depend on the differing criteria that are brought into play by the total
number of guidelines that might be applicable.
Without delineated issues, the court's only guides to the admissibility of evidence would
be the statutory purposes of sentencing and the criteria the Code required the Commission to
consider in formulating its various guidelines. With only these guides, at the commencement
of the sentencing hearing neither the court nor counsel would have any way of assessing
accurately the significance of certain evidence for fashioning a sentence. Without specified
issues, a court could not limit the introduction of evidence without inviting a post-sentencing
claim of error.
By narrowing the number of possibly applicable guidelines, defining the factual issues to
be tried, and resolving some facts by stipulation in a presentencing conference, however, the
judge will have set the stage for an orderly and time-conserving hearing. He will have re-
duced the potential for a post-sentencing rule 35(b)(2) motion requesting the court to apply a
different set of guidelines, as well as for motions requesting evidentiary hearings, such as the
government's in Disadvantaged's case. See text following note 198 supra. Further, he also will
have reduced the potential for meritorious appeals of sentences outside the guidelines.
By encouraging the defendant to raise all his objections to the validity of the Code's
sentencing scheme or to the potentially applicable guidelines, and by dealing with those ob-
jections prior to the imposition of sentence, the court will minimize the time and resources
necessary to dispose of the same objections later in post-sentencing motions under rule 35 or
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). Since the objections have been fully briefed, argued, and considered
prior to the imposition of sentence, usually the judge will be required simply to reconsider
counsels' points, along with any new matters arising after sentencing, and issue his rulings.
Everyone involved in the sentencing process should have a keen interest in using the
pretrial conference technique to ferret out, in advance of the sentencing hearing, the legal and
factual issues likely to be raised. First, the prosecutor should welcome the opportunity to
know what objections the defense will raise to the findings and conclusions of the presentence
investigation report or to the validity of the guidelines themselves. The prosecutor will bear
the burden of meeting these objections. Further, meaningful pretrial settlement of issues can
help reduce the frequency and scope of post-conviction collateral attacks and thereby free the
prosecutor's time and resources for other pressing business.
Defense counsel should be interested in using the pretrial conference technique because
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rect, comprehensive review of a sentence would require. Further, if
some of the appeals cannot be consolidated, judges and lawyers may
devote considerable time to redundant considerations.
This piecemeal review might also erode even further the alarmingly
low esteem in which the public holds our criminal sentencing rationale.
The Code's review scheme provides ample opportunity for apparently
inconsistent dispositions-a result the public undoubtedly will find both
unpalatable and indicative of poor planning. For example, a court of
appeals might affirm a conviction and a sentence outside the guidelines
only to reverse and remand for resentencing in a subsequent rule
35(b)(2) appeal because the lower court applied the wrong guidelines.
Similarly, it later might reverse and remand for resentencing in a rule
35(a) or a section 2255 appeal because the sentence was illegal. While
these decisions are not technically inconsistent, they would appear so to
the general public. That perception would not be entirely unwarranted,
and neither would the hostile reaction it could generate. Certainly the
people must be the ultimate beneficiaries of any criminal sentencing
code, and thus this potential for incurring their disfavor and frustration
is a decidedly untoward possibility. A reform measure that does not
engender public respect and support calls into question the efficacy of
that measure's corrective impact.
Finally, all these various routes to sentence review create substan-
tial delay in achieving finality. Speed in resolving questions of criminal-
ity has always been important in the American legal scheme. 280 Surely
it is just as important that questions about sentences be resolved quickly,
too. Yet, as has been demonstrated, challenges to a sentence may linger
on well beyond the time needed to dispatch an appeal of a conviction on
preparation for the conference may reveal issues otherwise left for post-sentence collateral
attack. By raising these issues before sentencing, counsel does not run the risk, in subsequent
collateral proceedings, of being held to have waived his objections by failing to present them
seasonably prior to the imposition of sentence.
Defense counsel should also have substantial incentive to telescope the sentencing hear-
ing and the collateral attack hearings so that the latter simply become perfunctory. Defense
counsel usually will have no economic incentive to drag out the sentencing process. More-
over, such a strategy would undermine his obligation to render his client effective assistance of
counsel, especially if his client is not free on bail or his bail is likely to terminate upon affirma-
tion of his conviction on appeal. The client may be forced to remain in prison, or return
there, while he awaits rulings on his post-sentencing motions. See note 193 & accompanying
text -fira.
The defendant, and society as well, will be the greatest beneficiaries of organized presen-
tencing procedures, for these procedures will ensure more rational, just application of the law
to the case.
280 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial."); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161, el seq (1976) (Speedy Trial Act);
FED. R. App. P. 45(b) (docketing priority to appeals in criminal cases); FED. R. CRIM. P.
50(b) (plans for achieving prompt disposition of criminal cases).
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the merits.28 1
3. Constitutional Questions and Questions of Satutog Interpretation
The constitutional questions discussed in the hypothetical case need
further debate in light of considered alternatives to S. 1722.282 While
Congress may find that the questions lack merit, it is far better to con-
sider them carefully before the bill is passed and to find ways to avoid
them whenever possible than to face these problems after the bill be-
comes law. A judicial decision striking down all or part of the guideline
sentencing structure after it is implemented could mean the dissipation
of much legislative energy, not to mention the wreaking of havoc in the
criminal justice system.
Further, as has been illustrated in the hypothetical case, S. 1722 has
many apparent internal inconsistencies and it leaves many questions un-
answered. Before acting, Congress should comb the bill carefully for
inconsistencies that may lead to problems of interpretation and supply
some missing answers.
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Whether or not Congress passes S. 1722 or a similar bill, the pro-
posed bill will have served the worthy function of raising practical, legal
and theoretical questions about our criminal justice system that schol-
ars, Congress and the judiciary alike must address before selecting the
best mode of reform. Having considered some of these issues in the con-
text of writing this article, I will pose a few suggestions of my own.
Congress might further the goal of reform and avoid the problems
generated by S. 1722 by passing a bill that (1) sets forth statutory pur-
poses for sentencing, (2) requires judges to state their reasons for impos-
ing each sentence in light of these purposes, and (3) provides one
comprehensive direct appeal of sentences and one mode of collateral re-
view.
One comprehensive direct appeal of sentences would be much sim-
pler and more efficient than the mode of review provided by S. 1722.283
281 See note 228 supra. The figures used in estimating the duration of the various types of
sentencing appeals assume that sentence appeals are "appeals in criminal cases" under FED.
R. ApP. P. 45(b), and thus will receive docketing priority. If they are not, these sentence
appeals will last even longer.
282 The lack of legal challenges to similar problems arising under the current Parole Com-
mission guidelines system may be attributed in part to fewer modes of review and a lack of
economic incentive for defense counsel to pursue such challenges.
283 Indeed, in the context of continuing its debates on the merits of S. 1722, Congress
should request an "impact on the judiciary" statement in order to assess the impact of the
bill's appeal provisions on the time and resources of the courts. Apparently, this practical
consideration has enjoyed little attention.
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The desire to avoid burdening the appellate courts with responsibility
for reviewing all sentences at least partially motivated Congress in de-
signing the bill's piecemeal system of review. 284 Yet, as has been demon-
srated, this system will create more problems than it will solve.
Collateral review should be necessary only in limited instances when a
problem is not proper for appeal-for example, when it involves an issue
that the defendant could not have raised at the sentencing hearing, such
as inadequate assistance of counsel. The currently existing provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 2255 would satisfy fully any need for collateral review that
might arise.
With statutory sentencing purposes and the trial court's statement
of reasons for imposing a sentence, the appellate court should be able to
provide, meaningful sentence review. Over a period of time the courts
would create a common law of sentencing that would, in itself, cut down
appreciably on unwarranted disparity. 28 5 Judicial reliance on informa-
tion-gathering projects, such as the PIMS program currently being de-
veloped under the auspices of the Judicial Conference, 28 6 would also
help to alleviate the problems of sentencing disparity.
Leaving some judicial sentencing discretion intact would help to
counterbalance and control the effect of prosecutorial discretion in the
sentencing function. If discretion to fashion sentences for criminal of-
fenders must exist within the system, it is better to leave it with federal
judges, whose form of selection, tenure, and compensation better ensures
impartiality and experience. It would be helpful if Congress clarified
the precise role the judiciary should play in the plea bargaining con-
text.287 Further, Congress should examine the effect of police and
prosecutorial discretion in sentencing disparity and explore new means
of controlling this discretion or ensuring its proper use. It should con-
sider consolidating the many police agencies to eliminate interagency
specialization and rivalry and the disparity these characteristics engen-
der. This consolidation in turn would aid the prosecutor in charging the
most serious offense demonstrable by the evidence. It is, after all, be-
yond question that the executive department has a constitutional obli-
284 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1133, 1139.
285 The argument that review under the proposed Code would lead to less disparity among
the circuits than might arise through simple appellate review without nationwide sentencing
guidelines is not persuasive. Under the S. 1722 guideline system, disparity among circuits
would be inevitable. The category of offense criteria--community view of the offense, public
concern generated by the offense, and incidence of the offense in the community, S. 1722,
supra note 12, tit. III, § 994(c)-are subject, to some extent, to the determination of individual
sentencing judges. Over time, their decisions would establish intercircuit conflicts reflecting
these differing attitudes about offense severity.
286 See note 3 supra.
287 See note 266 & accompanying text supra.
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gation, under the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
fifth amendment, to enforce the criminal laws in a non-arbitrary man-
ner. Indeed, if non-arbitrary enforcement is to be the keystone to fed-
eral criminal sentencing reform, Congress should also evaluate the
current method of selection, tenure and compensation of federal prose-
cutors and consider whether change might be needed.
Through these various means, Congress and the four primary com-
ponents of the criminal justice system, working together, could devise a
system-wide means to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparity while
avoiding many of the complexities and pitfalls of S. 1722 demonstrated
in the hypothetical case.
IV. CONCLUSION
Much has been written and said about the need for federal sentenc-
ing reform and the ability of S. 1722, its predecessors, and its House
counterparts to achieve it. In this article I have put the S. 1722 sentenc-
ing provisions to a practical test by imagining how they would operate
in a real case.
Based on the results of this test, it must be concluded that the cur-
rent reform effort has several major deficiencies. It needs refinement,
and once in its final form, it needs to be compared with wholly different
alternatives. Only through this painstaking process can we assure a fed-
eral criminal code that will gain the faith of the people.
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